Would you civil union me?: Taxation and civil unions in France by Leturcq, Marion
Would you civil union me?
Marion Leturcq
To cite this version:




Submitted on 3 Oct 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Would you civil union me?
Taxation and civil unions in France
Marion Leturcq (PSE and CREST)∗
This version : September 2011 †
First version : May 2009‡
Abstract
Although the tax system is not marriage neutral in many countries, it has been found only
slightly significant in determining marriage decision (Buffeteau and Echevin, 2003; Alm and Whit-
tington, 1995). This paper tests if the tax system could alter the decision to contract a civil union,
which is a less binding marital contract. In France, since 1999, couples can either contract a mar-
riage or a civil union (pacs). I assess the impact of taxation on the decision to contract a pacs
using a difference-in-differences evaluation of the 2005 reform of income taxation of newly pacsed
couples. As the control group is contaminated by the reform, I propose an original estimation
method based on a difference-in-differences-in-differences setting to estimate bounds to the impact
of the reform. My results suggest a positive and increasing impact of taxation on pacs rates, but
also a change in the timing of pacs indicating that taxation alters the decision to contract a pacs.
I find a slightly significant impact of taxation on the decision to break up a pacs.
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1 Introduction
Marriage markets have changed a lot since Becker’s seminal theory of marriage (1973; 1981). Both in
the US and in Western Europe, the most notable changes are the increasing divorce rate and the de-
creasing marriage rate. These changes tend to show that marriage is no longer a cohabitation contract
that goes without saying. Today, the why and when couples get married is a choice. Stevenson and
Wolfers (2007) highlight that "social and economic factors strongly influence the marriage market"
and that the marital status give labels that "have substantive economic content". This economic
content could influence marital choices of couples, indicating that it is not neutral to political choices.
In a classic cost/benefit framework, couples decide to marry if their utility when married is greater
than when cohabiting. Therefore, an attractive taxation for married couples should marginally impact
the marriage rate: the more benefic the taxation of married couples, the higher the marriage rate.
In the analysis of the marriage contracts proposed by Matouschek and Rasul (2008), an attractive
taxation of married couples can be considered as an exogenous benefit given to married couples. They
show that it should increase the marriage rate, through an increase of low quality couples’ marriage
(low quality couples meaning high probability of divorce). But if the cost of marriage is high, the
elasticity of marriage to taxation could be low. Therefore, examining the link between marriage and
taxation is an empirical question.
The empirical literature tends to support the idea that taxation slightly impacts marriage rates.
Using the heterogeneity in the ’marriage penalty’, papers by Alm and Whittington (1995; 1999) show
that if significant, the impact of taxation on marriage rate is small in the US. In France, Buffeteau
and Echevin (2003) study the impact of the reform of taxation for cohabiting couples with children
in 1995. They show that couples are sensitive to taxation: the probability of marriage has increased
by about 5 points for young cohabitant couples with children.
Maybe couples do not react much to fiscal incentives because the cost of marriage is high compared
to its fiscal benefit1. In particular, the symbolic cost of marriage is still high and the cost of divorce is
still important in France. In that case, what would happen if marriage was less symbolic and divorce
less costly? It would change the overall cost of marriage: by changing the balance between costs and
benefits, it could change the incentive to react to the benefits of marriage.
In France, different-sex couples can choose between two kind of marital contracts. The pacs2 was
created the November 15th, 1999. It aimed at giving same-sex couples a marital contract as same-sex
couples can not marry in France. It was made as a median way between cohabitation and marriage.
1There is no ’unilateral divorce’ in France.
2Pacs stands for Pacte Civil de Solidarité, Civil Pact of Solidarity.
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It gives more rights and duties to the partners than cohabitation but less than marriage (Waaldijk,
2005). Especially, one important difference is that it is easier to break up a pacs than a marriage and
that it is less symbolic: pacs are contracted at a court and marriage at the town hall. Since it was
created, the pacs had been popular among both different-sex and same-sex couples: the number of
pacs contracted increased from 20,000 in 2000 to 172,000 in 20093 (excluding overseas départements).
The pacs has been modified twice since it was created. Income taxation was different for pacsed
partners compared to married partners, it has been reformed in 2004 and taxation of pacsed couples
had been made similar to income taxation of married couples. In 2006, rights and duties of pacsed
partners changed and the pacs became a more binding contract, although it is still not as binding
as marriage is because it is easier to break than a marriage. The increasing number of pacs has
been largely attributed to the profitable taxation of pacsed couples, although this idea has not been
verified.
In France, the tax system takes into account the size of the household (including children) but
tax units are defined by the matrimonial status. Cohabiting couples have to fill two separate tax
returns, and pacsed and married can declare jointly their income so they fill only one tax return.
This system of joint taxation of married/pacsed couples makes them pay less taxes, especially if the
difference between the spouses’ incomes is large. The year of the marriage/pacs, couples have to fill
three tax returns: each spouse fills its own to declare the income earned before the marriage, and they
jointly fill one for the incomes earned after the marriage. This system leads to large gain on taxes
for couples, especially if they marry/pacs in the middle of the year. Therefore, it divides the year
between an attractive part and an unattractive part to contract a pacs. The goal of the paper is to
test the idea that taxation boosted pacs rates. For that purpose I analyze the 2005 reform of taxation
of pacsed couples. Before 2005, pacsed partners could not directly jointly fill one tax return right
after the pacs but they had to wait for three additional years before pooling their income for taxation
issues. Married couples could jointly declare their income right after the marriage. After 2005, pacsed
partners jointly declare their income right after the pacs. Therefore, the day of the pacs did not matter
before the reform but it does after the reform. The same system is applied for the year the pacs is
broken up. I analyze the impact of the reform in a difference-in-differences framework. I assume that
the reform has two impacts: first, it increases the pacs rate, second some couples may delay their
pacs from the unattractive part of the year to the attractive part. I show that a simple difference-
in-differences approach, that compares the evolution of pacs rates during the attractive part of the
3The pacs is now so popular in France that the terminology has changed. A new verb was created "se pacser" that
I translate into "to pacs", meaning "to contract a pacs". The verb "se pacser" appears now in the French dictionary
Larousse.
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year to the pacs rate contracting during the unattractive part of the year does not identify the effect
of the reform. I propose an extension to the difference-in-differences-in-differences estimation that
permits identifying bounds to the two impacts of the reform. The estimation relies on the observation
of two controls groups. Bounds are identified even if both control groups are contaminated by the
treatment, providing that they are differently affected one from the other.
My results suggest that the reform had a significant impact and that it increased the average pacs
rate by 13%-20% in 2006 until 16%-21% in 2009. However, I do not find any significant effect of
taxation on the decision to break up a pacs.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 explains the French system of income taxation
for married and pacsed couples. Section 3 describes the data and some summary statistics. Section
4 presents the identification strategy, section 5 shows the estimates of the impact of the income tax
reform on the number of pacs contracted and on the dissolution of pacs. Section 6 proposes an
interpretation of the results and section 7 concludes.
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2 The pacs, the income tax and the 2005 reform
2.1 The pacs: history and main changes
Demographic trends show that the use of marital institutions changed in France over the last decades.
With 3.97 marriage for 1000 inhabitants in 2007, the marriage rate in France is lower than the average
marriage rate in OECD countries (5 in 2007) and much lower than in the United-States (7.31 in 2007).
Couples tend to marry less and if they do, they marry older. In France, the marriage rate was about
two times higher in 1970 with 7.75 per 1000 persons (OECD, 2010). Moreover, in 2008, the age at
the first marriage in 29.7 for women and 31.6 for men. It was 26.7 and 28.6 in 1990. Then, marriage
often occurs after a long period of cohabitation. In 2006, in France, 38% of men and women aged
between 25 and 29 lived with their partner and are not married whereas 22% are married (INSEE,
2009). But describing marriage rates give a partial story of the marital strategies in France because
marital institutions also changed.
One of the most important change in the institution of marriage in France was the creation of the
pacs4, a new legal form of union. It was inspired by other European countries. In 1989, Denmark
paved the way to other countries by creating a new legal form of union, the registered partnership.
Then, a lot of countries (mostly European, but also in South America and some states in Canada and
the United States) created registered partnerships or civil unions5. They targeted same-sex couples
and their claim for legal recognition. As same-sex couples had become an important lobby, their
legal recognition was highly demanded. But the report directed by Waaldijk (2005) shows that the
rights given to partners by civil unions are very different from one country to another. Most countries
decided to create a median way between marriage and cohabitation. In Netherlands or in Sweden,
civil unions are very close to marriages. In France or in Belgium, at least when it was created, civil
unions were very different from marriage. Three main features distinguish most of civil unions from
marriages, whatever the country. First, partners are less committed because duties towards the other
partner are weaker. Second, civil unions do not give as many benefits to partners as marriage do.
Third, civil unions are easier to break. In most countries, civil unions are exclusively made for same-
sex couples. The French system is quite different. As in the Netherlands or in Belgium, different-sex
couples can also contract a civil union, and not only same-sex couples. Today, different-sex couples
can also contract a civil union in Brazil, South Africa, New Zealand, Quebec or Uruguay. Therefore, it
provided an alternative to the marriage for different-sex couples in a context of decrease in the use of
marriage. During the years following its creation, the pacs turned to be successful, especially among
4Pacte Civil de Solidarité, Civil pact of solidarity
5Let’s call civil unions all that new legal forms of unions.
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different-sex couples. In France, from its creation in 1999 to the end of 2009, 697,779 pacs have been
contracted (excluding overseas départements, DOM). From 22,276 pacs contracted in 2000 to 172,104
in 2009, the pacs turned to be very successful. In 2009, 40% of the unions celebrated were pacs.
Different-sex couples have found a legal form that fits very well their need: the Ministry of Justice
declared that in 2007 only 7% of new pacs were contracted by same-sex couples (Carrasco, 2007) and
this proportion is still decreasing (INSEE, 2009). The increase of pacs compensates the decrease of
the marriage rate: 6.71 unions (pacs+marriages) for 1000 persons were contracted in France in 2009
(5.5 in 2000).
When the pacs was created, the political area was highly divided on the topic and the success of
the pacs was unexpected6, because the political issue was mostly giving a legal recognition to same-sex
couples or not. The effect of such a contract on different-sex couples was not debated. In 1999, the
pacs was creating and legal dispositions made it different from the marriage but still attractive enough
to satisfy same-sex couples claims for recognition. It was made to give a legal recognition to couples
but without the symbolic meaning of marriage. Except the symbolic meaning, there were three main
differences between the marriage and the pacs. First, the pacs was not (and is still not) recognized as
a matrimonial status. This leads to different access to social benefit such as alimonies or survivor’s
benefit. Second, married couples benefited more from the tax system than pacsed couples. Third, it
was easier to break out a pacs than a marriage. However, the success of the pacs made it difficult to
sustain some inequality of treatment between the different types of couples. Therefore, three reforms
have made the pacs closer to the marriage. In 2005, the income taxation has been made similar for
pacsed couples and married couples. This change results from the claim for equity between couples,
as there was no reason why a pacsed couple would be taxed differently from a married couple. Before
2005, pacsed couples were taxed differently from married couples. Especially, couples benefited from
an attractive taxation the year they got married but not the year they get pacsed (this system is
explained below). The reform was announced in September 2004 and settled on the 1st of January
2005. A more general reform was voted in June 2006 and was settled on January 2007. Its goal
was to strengthen the commitment between pacsed partners. And in 2007, inheritance tax system
was changed both for pacsed and married couples. They are now the same for both types of couple.
Then, the 2005 reform coupled with the 2007 reform made the tax system similar for both married and
pacsed couples. Taxation makes the pacs attractive, and the anti-pacs politicians pointed out that it
was too benefic for a contract easy to break up as they feared tax evasion. The increasing number of
6But some authors pointed out that different-sex couples were likely to be interested in contracting a pacs: a report
written by the INED (1999) declared that 150,000 to 200,000 pacs a year could be registered.
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pacs contracting raises questions. Which couples get pacsed? Why do they contract a pacs? Is the
pacs a substitute to the marriage, a first step toward marriage or a substitute to cohabitation? But,
it is difficult to explain the growing number of pacs because a very few data are available on pacsed
couples and pacsed couples are mostly unknown. Carrasco (2007) describes that they are as old as
married couples and that despite they are easier to break, pacs are not more broken than marriages.
Both the relationship between marriage, pacs and cohabitation and the reason to contract a pacs are
difficult to understand because of the lack of data. The increasing success of the pacs has been read
as tax-related (INSEE, 2009; Carrasco, 2007) although no study assess a link between taxation and
the decision to contract a pacs.
2.2 The income taxation in France
The income taxation in France is collective: members of the same tax unit pool their income and fill
only one tax return. The tax unit is defined by the marital status of the partners. Cohabiting partners
are considered as two different tax units. Married partners are considered as one tax unit since the
wedding day. Before 2005, pacsed partners were considered as different tax units for the first three
years of their pacs, and as one tax unit after. Since 2005, as married partners, they are considered as
one tax unit since the day of the pacs. Therefore, since 2005, married and pacsed couples are taxed
the same way in France. The next paragraph describes how this taxation system changes the amount
of taxed paid.
The income tax is a progressive tax calculated on the income earned within the year. First of all,
a 10% relief is applied, then only 90% of the annual income is submitted to the income taxation. The
amount of income up to a certain amount t1 is taxed at a rate r1, then the remaining money, up to a
certain amount t2 is taxed at rate r2, etc... The amount ti+1− ti is taxed at a rate ri, with ri+1 > ri.
So, the income tax on the income I can be represented by f , a piecewise linear, continuous, increasing
and convex function.
A tax relief targets low-income households. If the amount of tax is less than an amount D, so if
f(I) < D, the household does not pay exactly f(I) but it benefits from a tax relief which is important
if f(I) is very low.






f(I)− D−f(I)2 , 0
)
if f(I) ≤ D
f(I) if f(I) > D
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The fiscal administration considers tax units, which size s depends on the matrimonial status and
the number of children. For a single, the size is equal to (1 + k), with k a function of the number
of kids. For a married couple, the size is equal to (2 + k). For example, a married couple without
children has a size s = 2, with one child the size is s = 2.5. The total amount of tax paid for a tax
unit of size s is s × g(I/s), where I is the total income of the tax unit. This fiscal system is called
quotient familial (family ratio). An unmarried couple is considered as two tax units. If they have
children, they have to divide children and put them in different tax units or put them all in the same
tax unit. A married couple with children is considered as a single tax unit.
When they cannot pool their income, the two partners have to fill one tax return each. So the
total amount of taxes paid by the household is given by:
g(C)(I) = smg(Im/sm) + sfg(If/sf )
where Im (resp. If ) denotes the male’s (resp. female’s) income and sm (resp. sf) the size of the
male tax unit. sm and sf depends on how children are split between the two tax returns. When they
can pool their income, the two spouses have to fill only one tax return instead of two. They pay two
times what someone earning the average income would have paid. Therefore, under the assumption
that children do not earn income: the household pays




Let f (C) (resp. f (M)) be the amount of tax paid by an unmarried (resp. married) couple if the tax
burden does not exist. Because of the convexity of f , f (C) ≥ f (M) (the proof is given by Buffeteau
and Echevin (2003)). However, Legendre and Thibault (2007) explain that it could be sometimes
more interesting to stay in cohabitation because of the tax relief, which introduces non-linearities
in the tax system for low income. So, f (C) ≥ f (M) does not necessarily implies g(C) ≥ g(M) for
low incomes. Therefore, marriage is not tax attractive for all couples. But as a general matter the
more different incomes are, the more couples benefit from being married. An interested reader should
report to Buffeteau and Echevin (2003), Legendre and Thibault (2007) or Amar and Guérin (2007)
for further explanations on that point. A particular fiscal arrangement the year of marriage sharply
decreases the amount of taxes. The decrease is so large that it benefits to all couples, even low income
households for whom marriage is not tax-benefic. So, low income couples benefit from being married
the first year of marriage, but not for the years after. Other households benefit for marriage, even in
the long term, but the benefit is larger the first year of marriage.
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The year they marry (or the year they contract a pacs since 2005), the partners have to fill three
tax returns: each partner fills her own tax return for the amount of income earned from the 1st
of January to the marriage day and they fill a common tax return for the income earned from the
marriage day to the 31st of December. If they get married (or pacsed) after a period of (t ∗ 100)% of
the year, they have to pay an amount of tax of:
g(Y M)(I) = sm × g(t ∗ Im/sm) + sf × g(t ∗ If/sf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B(t)
+ s× g





with s = (sm + sf ) in most cases. As the rates are not changed when incomes are earned on a
few months, the partners can minimize the amount of taxes by choosing the optimal marriage day.
Indeed, B(t) is increasing with t while A(t) is decreasing with t. Then, the amount of income taxes
to be paid for the year of the wedding depends on the difference of incomes between the partners
and on the wedding day. Most of the time, the optimal date occurs during the second or the third
quarter of the year. Figure 1 shows examples of the amount of taxes paid by five couples depending
on the day they marry. The greater the difference of income between the spouse, the closer to the
beginning of the 2nd quarter the optimal day is: even if they still pay taxes, the couples for whom
one spouse earns 40,000 euros a year and the other one does not work and the couple with incomes
30,000 and 10,000 save more taxes marrying during the second quarter. Lower income households do
not pay taxes at all if they marry during the third quarter. Using data from the Labour Force Survey
(LFS), it is possible to compute for each unmarried couple which day (or days) is (are) the optimal
one(s) for them. Notice that because of the tax relief for low income, lot of couples could have no
tax at all to pay for the year of marriage. They could have the choice between a large number of
optimal day. The LFS provides information for each couple about their marital status, the number
of children and their wages. I compute for each unmarried couple with at least one employed partner
the amount of taxes that they would pay if they decided to get married, for each day of the year7.
I can therefore simulate which day would be the optimal one for each couple, and how much they
save compare to a regular year when married and compare to a regular year when unmarried. Figure
2 gives the distribution of the optimal days among the population of unmarried couples, depending
on the number of children they have8. The figure clearly shows that for most couples, the optimal
7The computation does not take into account Prime Pour l’Emploi, a tax credit settled in 2001. Only the labor
income (wage) is considered. This is obviously an underestimation of the total income of the household as it does not
take into account other sources of income.
8When a couple has the choice between several optimal days, I keep all of them for the figure. So the couple appears
as many times as there are optimal days. Therefore, the area under the line does not give the number of unmarried
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day occurs during the 2nd or the 3rd quarter, including when they have children. Couples for whom
the optimal day occurs during the first or the fourth quarter are mostly low income couples that do
not pay taxes including for a regular year. Figure 3 simulates the amount of tax that unmarried
couples would pay (in % of income) for a regular year if unmarried/unpacsed, for a regular year if
married/pacsed and for the year of marriage/pacs. It clearly shows that couples pay less taxes for
the year of their marriage/pacs. Only the 10% richest couples are not able to avoid paying any taxes
the year they get married/pacsed, but they only pay 3% of their annual income. The remaining 90%
of the population are able to avoid paying any taxes for the year of their marriage/pacs, providing
they get married/pacsed the optimal day.
2.3 The 2005 reform of the taxation of pacsed partners
Before 2005, the taxation of pacsed partners was different from the taxation of married couples.
Especially, they did not benefit from the fiscal arrangements the year of pacs as married couples did.
The pacsed partners had to wait for the third year after they contracted their pacs in order to pool
incomes and to fill one tax return for the incomes earned during the whole year. And then, they were
taxed the same way as married couples. As a consequence, the date of pacs did not have any effect on
the amount of taxes paid neither the year the pacs was contracted nor three years later, when they
pooled their income. Since 2005, pacsed couples have to fill three tax returns for the year of the pacs,
exactly as married couples do. The reform reduces significantly the amount of taxes paid for the year
of the pacs. If the incomes of partners are significantly different, it leads to reduce the amount paid
the two years after the pacs. After, the amount of taxes paid is the same before and after the reform.
Most of the time, couples marry and celebrate their marriage the same day. So, as the partners
have many factors to deal with when deciding the date for marriage, it is hard to believe that couples
choose the date of the marriage in order to minimize the amount of taxes paid. On the contrary, a
pacs is not as celebrated as a marriage. If it is celebrated, the celebration is not organized the day
the pacs is contracted because as the pacs is contracted in a court, it is contracted during the week,
without any witness (Rault, 2009). Then it is possible to choose the optimal date to contract the
pacs and to celebrate it later. As there are not as many factors that could determine the pacs day as
for marriage day, couples are able to choose the date in order to minimize the amount of tax paid.
The reform makes the pacs more attractive than what it was to unmarried couples, because it can
lead to pay less taxes the year of the pacs. Moreover, breaking a pacs is easy and costless9, then the
couples in France but the number of optimal days.
9It has changed in 2006. It is still easy to break a pacs but the reform of the pacs of 2006 made the commitment
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commitment induces by a pacs is not very strong. However, if the pacs is broken during the same
year or during the following year, the effect on the income tax is canceled. Notice that when a pacs
is broken at least two years after it is contracted, the partners have to fill three tax returns for the
income earned the year of the dissolution, one for the couple for the period from 1st of January to
the dissolution day and one for each partner from the dissolution day to the end of the year. A letter
is sufficient to break a pacs10, making the dissolution easy and fast. As a consequence, the partners
have the opportunity to pay less taxes the year the pacs is broken up by choosing the optimal date.
Thus, under the assumption that couples answering to the incentive induced by the reform have
the optimal answer, four effects should be observed. First, as the pacs is made more attractive, more
pacs should be contracted after 2005. Second, tax-induced pacs should be observed during the second
or the third quarter. Third, couples should not break their pacs during the same year or during the
following year they contracted their pacs (i.e. until the next tax return). Fourth, couples who break
their pacs may do it during the second or the third quarter.
One should bear in mind that the reform also changed the amount of income taxes paid for the
next two years of the pacs year, compared to the amount of income taxes paid by partners that had
pacsed before the reform. Three years after the year of the pacs, the income taxation is the same after
and before the reform. Therefore, a positive impact of the reform on the number of pacs contracted
means that short-term issues are taken into account in the decision to pacs. The last interesting point
is that in 2005 nothing changed for the pacs except the income taxation.
However, some changes in the legislation of the pacs occured after 2005. Moreover, the legislation
of divorce has also changed in 2005, making the divorce easier11. It could change the opportunity
cost of being pacsed. The competition between pacs and marriage could be more fierce: couples that
would have contracted a pacs do not hesitate contracting a marriage because it is less committing.
But the link between pacs and marriage is unclear and it depends on the model of formation and
dissolution chosen. The cost of divorce is still higher than the cost of separation of a pacs, so it is
very unlikely that couples consider that the two contracts are now closer. Moreover, as explained in
the section on the estimation strategy, these two changes are not likely to affect my results.
between partners stronger and it gives the partners the right to court the partner for the damages induced by the
dissolution.
10A letter is sufficient if both the partners agree on the dissolution. If only one partner wants to dissolve a pacs, he
has to send a letter through a lawyer.
11However, the change in the divorce law is not a large change: only one hearing with the judge is compulsory instead
of two. So it does not change the condition of the divorce, but it can reduce its duration.
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3 Data and preliminary evidences
3.1 Available Data
A pacs is not contracted at the town hall as marriages but at the closest court from the place where
at least one partner lives. Then, data belong to the Ministry of Justice. Micro data have been highly
protected until 2004. The legislator feared for homophobia and violence towards pacsed people.
Therefore, they decided to protect couples by registering pacsed couples on a secret file that was not
available, even for statisticians from the Ministry of Justice and by preventing national surveys from
asking couples if they were pacsed or not. Therefore, the main surveys in France, such as the Labor
Force Survey, do not include any information about pacs. Because of the growing number of pacs, the
protection disappeared in 2005 but micro data are still not available, except for statisticians from the
Ministry of Justice. That is why some descriptive figures on pacsed couples are available thanks to
Carrasco (2007). But, only aggregated data on the number of contracted are available, which make
it impossible to have access to crucial information, such as the incomes of the partners. Therefore,
only the total impact of the reform and not the heterogeneity of the impact in the population as it
is not possible to gauge the effects of the reform at different level of income. Similarly, the data give
the aggregated number of broken pacs, and not the duration of the broken pacs. So it is not possible
to evaluate the hasard rate of dissolution of pacs.
The data only give the number of pacs contracted and broken up in each court, for each quarter.
There are 462 courts in France (20 in Paris, so it makes 443 when Paris is aggregated). Then I con-
sider 10 years, i.e. 40 quarters. Therefore I have 18480 observations (17720 when Paris is aggregated).
Controls are constructed using census data, at the town level. Towns are then gathered into
courts. Therefore, the geographical unit is the smallest unit on which the pacs rate can be computed.
3.2 Demographic trends
The marriage rate decreased since 1980, except for some short period of time. Since it was created in
1999, the number of pacs contracted by year increased a lot leading to an increasing overall union rate.
The number of pacs contracted has increased a lot since it was created (see table 2). 22,108 pacs
were contracted in 2000, the first complete year of the pacs, and 172,104 were contracted in 2009.
In 2000, approximately 284,000 marriages were celebrated, and 254,000 in 2009. Therefore, the total
number of unions increased in France over the last decade. However, the proportion of pacs couples
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in the population remains small, because it is still a recent form of union. The fiscal statistics12
indicates that in 2009, over 100 persons filling their fiscal form, 1.6 is filled by a pacsed person, 50.8
by a married couple, 29.4 by a single, 10.1 by divorced individual and 8.1 by a widow.
The increase in the number of pacs and the decrease in the number of marriages is wide spread
in France. As table 2 shows, the pacs rate per 1000 persons aged 15-59 years old13 has increased in
all courts: the mean pacs rate has increased from 0.5 in 2000 (with a standard deviation of 0.22) to
4.05 in 2009 (with a standard deviation of 1.11).
Figure 7 illustrates the decrease of the marriage rate and the increase of the overall number of
unions. The marriage rate for 1000 persons aged 15-59 decreased in all courts: it was 10.0 (sd of 2.70)
in 1980 and it is 6.2 (sd 0.81) in 2009. The marriage rate is still higher than the pacs rate, although
they tend to be closer. Defining unions as the sum of pacs and marriages contracted in each court,
the union rate per 1000 persons aged 15 to 59 years old in 2009 is greater to what it was in 1981:
it was equal to 10.0 in 1981, it is equal to 10.3 in 2009 but it was equal to 7.5 when the pacs was
created in 1999.
As expected, the seasonality of the pacs changed after the reform. Figure 4 shows that the pacs
rate increased for each quarter, but the seasonality was completely reversed after the reform. The
number of pacs contracted during the first quarter decreased right after the reform. This could be
explained by a schedule impact: some couples decided to contract a pacs but instead of contracting
it immediately after they took their decision, they have waited for a few months in order to benefit
from the newly attractive tax system.
The evolution of the number of broken pacs should follow the same pattern. However, the duration
of the broken pacs is not observed. As a consequence, the hazard rate can not be computed. Using
the number of ever contracted pacs in the court as a denominator would be an inaccurate estimate
of the hazard rate because the increasing number of contracted pacs change the composition of
pacs couples. Indeed, the proportion of newly pacsed couples tends to increase, making difficult the
interpretation of the stability of the pacs rate. As a consequence, I study the evolution of the crude
rate of dissolution. It is computed as the number of broken pacs for 1000 persons aged 15-59. Table
12Déclarations Nationales d’Impôt sur le Revenu,
http://www2.impots.gouv.fr/documentation/statistiques/2042_nat/Impot_sur_le_revenu.htm
13Although the age of pacsed spouses is unknown, I assume that most pacs are contracted by partners less than
60 years old. This assumption seems reasonable since (a) Carrasco (2007) showed that pacsed couples are similar to
couples getting married for the first time and (b) only 2.3% in 2000 and 4.7% in 2009 of marriages were contracted by
partners aged more than 60. This rate seems more intuitive than the classic raw rate for 1000 persons.
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3 shows that the number of dissolution increased a lot. But the level of the rate of dissolution heavily
relies on the number of ever contracted pacs. However, if couples change their separation behavior for
fiscal reasons, the seasonality of the dissolution of pacs should change after the reform. Therefore, I
will not comment much on the level of the dissolution rate but on the seasonality. The seasonality of
the dissolution of pacs is presented in figure 5. The number of dissolutions was already higher during
the attractive part of the year before the reform. The seasonality does not change after the reform,
and it tends to be reinforced after.
I also present the results for the dissolution rate computed as the number of dissolution per 1000
pacsed couples. Table 4 shows that after a large increase during the first years the dissolution rate
tended to become stable. But this evolution is difficult to interpret. Indeed, the large increase in the
pacs rate changes the population of pacsed couples over the time. Figure 6 presents the seasonality
of this dissolution rate: it is not changed after the reform of taxation.
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4 The estimation strategy
4.1 Limits of a difference-in-differences estimator
The identification strategy relies on the characteristics of the taxation system. Indeed, the way the
quotient familial is implemented introduces a distinction between two parts of the year: the attractive
part and the unattractive part for taxation matters. The attractive part is composed of the 2nd and
the 3rd quarters (spring and summer) and the unattractive part is composed of the 1st and the 4th
quarter (autumn and winter).
The identification strategy relies on the idea that couples getting pacsed because of the reform are
going to contract their pacs during the attractive part of the year. The estimation of the total impact
of the reform is easily obtained by a difference-in-differences estimation strategy using the quarters
of the unattractive part of the year as a control group and the quarters of the attractive part of the
year as a treated group. This estimation gives the impact of the reform under two main assumptions:
(a) The number of pacs contracted during the unattractive part of the year is unaffected by the
reform.
(b) Without the reform, the number of pacs contracted during the attractive part of the year would
have evolved the same way as the number of pacs contracted during the unattractive part of
the year (common trend assumption).
If the two assumptions are verified, comparing the evolution of the number of pacs contracted
during the attractive part of the year to the evolution of the number of pacs contracted during the
unattractive part of the year gives the total impact of the reform.
These two main assumptions could be unverified for two main reasons. First, remember that
the reform modified the income taxation for the three years following the pacs, even if the first year
is the most affected. So, the unattractive part of the year could also be affected because couples
contracting a pacs during this part of the year see the taxes they pay modified during the first three
years following the pacs. So the number of pacs contracted could increase during both part of the year.
As a consequence, if the unattractive part of the year is also affected by an increase in pacsed couples
because of the reform, this increase is going to be interpreted as the year effect, so the difference-in-
differences estimation is biased and it underestimates the true impact of the reform, because it takes
as a baseline the number of pacs contracted during the unattractive part of the year, which is boosted
by the reform. However, as it is much more profitable to contract a pacs during the attractive part
of the year, it is likely that couples getting pacsed for fiscal reasons are going to contract their pacs
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during the attractive part of the year, so it is highly believable that the number of pacs contracted
during the unattractive part of the year is unaffected by the reform even if couples contracting their
pacs during this part of the year are also affected by the reform.
Moreover, the difference-in-differences method only gives the total impact of the reform, which
is composed of two effects. First, the reform could have a direct and positive impact on the num-
ber of pacs contracted. Second, the reform could have an indirect impact: couples that would have
contracted a pacs anyway are now more likely to do so during the attractive part of the year. Let’s
call this impact the "schedule impact". In that case, the number of pacs contracted during the
unattractive part of the year is lower than what it would have been if the schedule impact was null.
In other words, the stable unit treatment value assumption defined by Joshua D. Angrist and Rubin
(1996) does not hold. Therefore, the difference-in-differences estimator estimates the total impact of
the reform, including the schedule impact. It is not possible to disentangle the direct impact of the
reform from the schedule impact of the reform unless one assumption is added.
This problem is similar to a problem of contamination between the two groups: let yiqT be the
rate of pacs contracted in the court i, during the quarter q of the year T . Years are recoded in order
to begin with the 4th quarter and to end with the 3rd quarter. The recoding makes sense because:
(a) the pacs was created in the 4th quarter 1999
(b) the reform was announced just before the beginning of the fourth quarter 2004. As, it was an
unexpected reform, couples were not able to delay their pacs in order to benefit from the reform
before the 4th quarter of 2004.
yiqT is written as:
yiqT = α0 + αT + αiq + δqT + uiqT
where αT is the year fixed-effect, αiq is a combined fixed effect for courts and quarters and δqT
are a combined fixed effect of year and quarters. The impact of the reform on the pacs rate is given
by the evolution of the δqT s. The δs are composed of the direct and the schedule impact. On the
one hand, let βT give the direct impact of the reform: the pacs rate increases with βT during the
attractive part of the year in year T . On the other hand, let γT represent the schedule impact: it
increases the pacs rate during the attractive part and decreases the pacs rate during the unattractive
part of the year. The attractive part of the year is divided into two quarters: let p1T (resp. p2T ) be
the part of the direct impact βT (resp. schedule impact γT ) of the reform contracted during the 2
nd
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quarter. The unattractive part is also divided into two quarters: let p0T be the proportion of couples





−(1− p0T )γT , if q=4
−p0TγT , if q=1
p1TβT + p2TγT , if q=2
(1− p1T )βT + (1− p2T )γT , if q=3
The δqT represents 5 parameters and there are only 4 equations. There are clearly too much
parameters and the estimation of such a model is infeasible.
As we are interested in the βT s, the γT s and the αT s, the pacs rate can be written as yisT where
s indicates the semester. s = 1 for the unattractive part of the year and s = 2 for the attractive
part of the year. yiT,s=1 = yiT,q=1 + yiT,q=4 is the pacs rate for the unattractive part of the year and
yiT,s=2 = yiT,q=2 + yiT,q=3 is the pacs rate for the attractive part of the year.





−γT , if s=1;
βT + γT , if s=2;
A difference-in-difference estimation would give an estimation of αT − γT as the year effect and
βT + 2γT as the impact of the reform. Therefore, if γT > 0, it tends to underestimate the year
fixed effect and to overestimate the incentive impact of the reform. Nevertheless, the DID estimator
provides an estimation of the total impact of the reform on couples’s behavior.
4.2 Identifying bounds: extended difference-in-differences-in-differences
The usual way to get rid off externalities consists in using two control groups and to compute a
difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) estimator. One control group (C1) is affected by the
reform and loose γT pacs, but the other (C2) is not affected. The treated group (T) receive the direct
impact of the reform and the delaying pacs (βT + γT pacs). Comparing T and C2 identifies βT + γT ,
comparing C2 and C1 identifies γT and the comparison of the differences identifies βT .
17
Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish two control groups in the pacs case, but the DDD estimator
could be extended in the case in which there are two controls group that are not affected with the
same intensity by the reform. Taking advantage of the variation between the control groups does
not permit a point identification of the incentive impact of the reform, but it gives bounds for the
incentive impact of the reform. The estimation method is called thereafter "extended difference-in-
differences-in-differences" or E3D for clarity reasons.
I consider two control groups: the fourth and the first quarter of the year. Both quarters are
untreated, because they are part of the unattractive part of the year. Yet, both of them can suffer
from negative externalities: some couples are likely to delay their pacs to wait for a more attractive
part of the year to contract their pacs. But both quarters are not likely to be affected the same way:
if couples have a large enough preference for the present, it might be more difficult to delay a pacs
from the fourth quarter to the next spring/summer than from the first quarter to the next spring.
In order to disentangle the direct impact of the reform from the schedule impact, I recode the
time windows q in a variable t such as, t = 0 for the fourth quarter, t = 1 for the first one and t = 2
for the sum of the second and the third quarters. Then:





−(1− pT )γT , if t=0;
−pTγT , if t=1;
α0 + αT + βT + γT , if t=2;
pT is the proportion of delayed pacs that would have been contracted during the first quarter,
have they not delay their pacs. The closer pT from 1/2, the more similar the two controls group are.
The extreme case, pT = 1/2 prevents from identifying γT , because the difference between the two
controls group is 0. On the contrary, pT = 1 and pT = 0 corresponds to the DDD estimator.
The difference-in-differences-in-differences method gives an estimation of the βT s, the γT s and the
αT s that depends on the value of pT . Indeed, the estimated equation is:
yitT = α0 + αit + a0T + a1T + a2T + uitT (3)
with the αiT s are court crossed with period of the year fixed effect, the a0T s are year fixed effects,




a0T = αT − (1− pT )γT
a1T = (1− 2pT )γT
a2T = αT + βT + (2− pT )γT
The akT are statistical parameters, used to estimate the interpretable parameters αT , βT and γT .
Then, for a given pT :















Therefore, the identification of the bounds requires some conditions on the parameters: if a1T < 0
and a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0 ∀T ≥ 0 or if a1T > 0 and a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0 ∀T ≥ 0 then it is possible
to identify an upper and a lower bounds to the βT and the γT (see the proof in section A.1 in the
appendix). These conditions are easily verified in the data. But the estimation of informative bounds
requires two assumptions. The first assumption simply states that βT ≥ 0 and γT ≥ 0,∀T ≥ T0. This
assumption is not very strong as it stipulates that if the reform has an impact on couples behavior, it
has been indeed incentive and it did not discourage couples to contract a pacs during the attractive
part of the year. Moreover, it indicates that delaying pacs are going from the unattractive part of
the year to the attractive part of the year. This assumption is likely to be unverified if some couples
prefer to wait for the unattractive part of the year to signal that their pacs is not a tax induced
pacs. It is also unverified if the reform implied an important increase in the number of pacs, leading
to overburden courts and a crowing out effect. Although this story can not be rejected, it is very
unlikely to affect the courts the first year after the reform. Indeed, the impact of the reform, albeit
strong, is not likely to be strong enough to induce a large crowding out effect: registering a pacs is a
simple administrative procedure and some employees were already affected to registering pacs. After
some years, the court may adjust their labor force to the increasing number of pacs.
It is always possible to find a pT such as βT (pT ) = 0, and the bound is not informative. So, the
second required assumption is that pT , the proportion of delaying couples that would have contracted
a pacs during the first semester is constant over time. A change in this proportion could be justified
by a relative change of the composition of couples willing to get pacsed during the fourth quarter
compared to couples willing to get pacsed during the first quarter. This is unlikely, as the reform of
taxation is the only reform of the pacs that might change the seasonal composition of pacsed popu-
lation.
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In order to define the bounds, I fix a p∗, which is the only p such as γT (p) ≥ 0 and βT (p) ≥ 0, for
all T and p ≥ p∗. If p ∈]1/2,+∞[, the bounds are given by:


αT (p) ∈ [αT (1);αT (p
∗)]
γT (p) ∈ [γT (1); γT (p
∗)]
βT (p) ∈ [βT (p
∗);βT (1)]
Notice that both the DID and the E3D estimation strategy relies on the change in the seasonality
of the pacs. As a consequence, the results are likely to be biased if the seasonality is affected at
the same time. In 2005, the divorce law has been modified, making the divorce easier. It could
alter my results if the couples likely to contract a pacs during the attractive part of the year react
to the change in the divorce law differently from those couples likely to contract a pacs during the
unattractive part of the year. Although this assumption can not be tested, it seems rather unlikely.
Indeed, as explained if Rault (2009), the decision to contract a pacs is led by very different reasons
and it is impossible to assume a systematic link between the seasonality of pacs and the marriage
elasticity of couples to the cost of divorce. The same argument apply for any changes in the pacs
law after 2005: it only alters the results if the three parts of the year are not affected similarly. The
2006 reform of the pacs reinforces the duties of pacsed partners toward the other partner and the
2007 reform modifies the taxation of inheritance: both of them should not affect the seasonality of
the pacs.
5 Results
5.1 Effect on the pacs rate
All estimations presented above are based on a difference-in-differences estimation. Therefore, the
standard errors might be biased downward in case of autocorrelation of the error terms, as explained
in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). As a consequence, all standard errors are clustered at
the court level.
The explained variable is the pacs rate for 1000 persons aged 15-59. First I estimate the difference-
in-differences model, given by the equation 1. Results are given by the table 5. Columns (1) and (2)
give results without introducing fixed effects. The introduction of control variables does not change
the point estimate of year effects and year× sem.2 fixed effects, but the point estimate of the constant.
It means that adding controls does not necessarily improve the estimation because these controls do
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not add any relevant information. My favorite estimation is given in column (3). It introduces some
court × sem.2 fixed effects. The impact of the reform is given by the evolution of the year×sem.2
fixed effects, which is plotted in figure 8. Before 2005, the point estimates for the coefficients for
year×sem.2 variables are very low, although they are significant for early years. It means that the
second semesters in 2001 and 2002 could have been slightly different from the second semester in 2000.
But the main evolution occurs after 2005: after 2005, the coefficients start increasing a lot. It reveals
a systematic change in the seasonality right after the reform of the pacs. However, as explained in
the previous section, this estimation can result from both the incentive effect of the pacs and from
the delaying effect of the pacs.
Then, I estimate the model described by equation 3 using the E3D method, in order to define
bounds for the impact of the reform. As a robustness check, I construct another explained variable:
the pacs rate for 1000 couples. However, this variable is likely to have high measurement errors
because couples are not well measured in France. Indeed, until the last census, people were not asked
if they were single or not. Therefore, the number of couples was approximated by the number of
married couples before 2006. For each explained variables, I also test the robustness of the results
using different specifications: including crossed court-period of the year fixed effects compared to
period of the year fixed effects or including time varying variables as controls regarding the socio-
economic environment, although these controls have not been found having a good explanatory power
for the difference in difference estimation.
Results of the regression for the number of pacs contracted are given by the tables 6 and 7. The
parameters are not interesting per se but they are used to check if the necessary conditions are verified
or not. My results are robust across specifications using both pacs rates. So I construct the results of
the estimation of the structural parameters only for the full specification, i.e. the pacs rate per 15-59
years old persons, including controls and court crossed with period of the year fixed effects.
For each specification, the last column indicates if the required conditions a1T < 0 and a2T −a0T +
a1T > 0,∀T ≥ T0 are verified (as I suspect p > 1/2, i.e. more delayed pacs for the first quarter than
for the fourth). They are clearly verified for all years after the reform. Therefore, it is possible to find
a p such as 1 ≥ p > 1/2, in order to construct the upper and lower bounds to the direct and the sched-
ule impacts of the reform. p∗ = 0.853 is the lowest p such as γT (p) ≥ 0 and βT (p) ≥ 0 for all years
after the reform. The structural parameters αT (p), γT (p) and βT (p) are estimated using the system 4.
The estimated upper and lower bounds of the reform are given in table 12 and plotted in figures
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10. The direct impact of the reform increased over time: it is very close to zero in 2005, but it
raised with 0.23-0.33 points the average pacs rate per 15-59 persons in a court in 2006. In 2009,
fiscal incentives resulted in an increase with 0.65-0.85 points in the pacs rate. The schedule impact of
the reform stayed constant after the reform. The pacs rate during the unattractive part of the year
decreased with 0.16-0.23 point each year, leading to an increase with 0.16-0.23 point each year during
the attractive part of the year. This two effects comes in addition to the natural increase in the pacs
rate. The average pacs rate remained stable during the first two years compared to the average pacs
rate in 2000. It increased with 0.04 points in 2003, until 0.69-0.73 in 2009.
Table 13 presents the proportion of the pacs rate that can be attributed to the reform. The direct
impact of the reform increased the average pacs rate by 13%-20% in 2006 until 16%-21% in 2009.
The schedule impacts represents around 7%-10% of the pacs rate in 2006 and 6%-8% in 2009.
The counterfactual of the average pacs rate without the reform is given by figures 11. The figures
clearly show that the pacs rate would have been lower without the reform, but it would have increased
anyway. Therefore, fiscal incentives only explain part of the total increase of pacs rates in France.
The overall increase of the pacs rate would have been more equally distributed over quarters without
fiscal incentives.
5.2 Effects on dissolutions
As the pacs is easily broken, couples could adjust their decision to break up their pacs to the tax
system in order to benefit from its effects the year they break up.
There are four different ways to break up a pacs. First, if partners agree on the dissolution, they
can send a letter to the court to break up the pacs. This is a mutual consent breaking. Second,
if partners do not agree, a pacs can be unilaterally broken up: the leaving partner has to write a
letter to the court and to the other partner through a lawyer to announce its decision. Third, a
pacs is automatically broken when the couple get married in which case partners do not have to send
any letter to the court. Fourth, the pacs is automatically broken if one of the partners dies and the
surviving partner does not need to write a letter to the court. In all cases but marriage, partners
benefit from the three tax returns system. As death is not a choice, only the number of mutual
consent and unilateral dissolutions are likely to be affected by the reform. Thereafter, the dissolution
rates consider only those two types of dissolution.
A simple letter is sufficient to break up a pacs: the schedule could be manipulated by couples.
I study the impact of the reform on dissolution rates using the same framework as the contracted
pacs rate. Indeed, the expected impacts of the reform, if any, should be similar. As for the year
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the pacs is contracted, couples face the same tax system (but inverted) the year the pacs is broken
up. The couple has to fill three tax returns: they pool their incomes for the first part of the year
until the day the pacs is broken and they have to fill two tax return for the part of the year after
the pacs is broken. Therefore, they could benefit from the same attractive taxation. If couples are
sensitive to that incentive, two impacts are expected: (1) an increase in the number of broken pacs, (2)
more pacs should be broken during the attractive part of the year, resulting from an incentive effect
and a schedule effect. The estimation strategy is the same as before. The difference-in-differences
strategy identifies the impact of the reform on the number of dissolutions under the common trend
assumption, considering the unattractive part of the year as a control group. As for the contracted
pacs, bounds of the direct and the schedule effect could be identified using the E3D method if the
number of broken pacs is significantly different between the two control groups, i.e. if the conditions
a1T < 0 and a2T −a0T +a1T > 0,∀T ≥ T0 or a1T > 0 and a2T −a0T −3a1T > 0,∀T ≥ T0 are verified.
An increase in the number of dissolutions could be observed right after the reform, because the
tax system gives an incentive to break up the pacs to all pacsed couples. But the increase should
be more accurate after 2007. The increase in the number of pacs because of the direct impact of
the reform on contracted pacs could change the composition of pacsed couples. Especially, couples
sensitive to taxation are now pacsed and they could also be sensitive to incentives to break up their
pacs. But they have to remain pacsed the year following their pacs to benefit from the attractive tax
system. So if they decide to break up their pacs for tax benefit, they should do it two years later.
Therefore, an increase of the dissolution rate could be observe after 2005, another after 2007.
I consider two definitions of dissolution rates: (1) the number of dissolution for 1000 pacs (con-
tracted at least 6 months before), (2) the number of dissolution for 1000 persons aged 15-59 years old.
However, none of them is easily interpretable. The number of dissolutions for 1000 pacs takes into
account the at-risk population, i.e. the pacsed couples. However, the large increase in the pacs rate,
especially after 2005, change the composition of the pacsed population. It makes the ratio difficult
to interpret as it considers all pacs as similarly affected by the risk of separation. Moreover, the
seasonality increase the number of pacs differently over the year, adding couples unlikely to break up.
The ratio is computed for 1000 pacs contracted at least 6 months before in order to take into account
population more likely to break up. The number of dissolution for 1000 persons aged 15-59 years old
does not take into account the at-risk population. It just rescales the number of dissolution to take
into account differences in the size of the courts.
The difference in differences estimation is given in tables 8 and 9. Considering the rate of broken
pacs for 1000 persons, the affected semester tends to be always different from the unaffected semester
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(columns (1) to (4)). This is no longer the case when considering the rate of broken pacs for 1000
pacs in table 9, especially when court×sem. fixed effects are added (columns (7) and (8)). It shows
that the rate of broken pacs for 1000 pacs is unaffected by the reform. The rate of dissolution for 1000
pacs is affected by the reform when court×sem. fixed effects are not added. Excluding court×sem.
increases the point estimate which could explain that it becomes significant. On the contrary, the DID
estimation on the rate of broken pacs for 1000 persons aged 15-59 shows that the variable year×sem.
tend to be significant, indicating that the second semester has followed a different path from the first
semester even before the reform. However, this is no longer the case when the court×sem. are added.
So the difference between the first and the second semester was stable across time before the reform.
The point estimate increases suddenly from 0 in 2004 to 0.0166 in 2005: the reform had an impact on
the the rate of dissolution for 1000 persons aged 15-59. Surprisingly, it decreases in 2007 from 0.0156
to 0.00862, but it increases after. This change could be attributed to a change in the composition of
the population of pacsed partners after 2005. As this impact could be attributed to couples delaying
the day they break up the pacs or to the incentive impact of the reform, I estimate the model using
the extended DDD method given in 3 for the rate of dissolution for 1000 persons aged 15-59 years old,
in order to identify bounds to both effects. It is not necessary to estimate the model using the E3D
method for the dissolution rate for 1000 as the difference-in-differences estimation does not exhibit
any impact of the reform.
The results of the estimation of the extended DDD are given by the table 11. The results are
more difficult to interpret than results on the contracted pacs because the sign of a1T is not constant
after the reform: couples were less likely to break up their pacs during the first quarter than during
the fourth quarter from 2005 to 2007, and this is reversed in 2008 and 2009. The coefficients a1T are
not (or slightly) significant in 2007 and 2008. It denotes that the dissolution rates during first quarter
is not statistically different from the dissolution rate during the fourth quarter. The identification
of bounds requires that the sign of the a1T is constant across T , in order to determine p
∗. As a
consequence, it is not possible to identify bounds on the two potential effects of the reform in the
case of broken pacs.
The difference-in-differences estimation tends to show that the reform did impact the behavior of
couples toward the dissolution of their pacs as it increases the relative number of dissolution during
the attractive part of the year compare to the attractive part of the year. However, it is not possible
to disentangle the incentive impact from the schedule impact of the reform on broken pacs. The
difference-in-differences estimation of the impact of the reform on the number of dissolution on the
number of ever contracted pacs does not exhibit any impact of taxation on dissolution behavior, but
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this rate is an inappropriate measure of the hazard rate of dissolution.
6 Interpretation
The different evolutions of the distinct effects of the reform can be explained by information issues.
During its first years, the pacs was still a new contract and it was thought same-sex couples targeting,
because the public debate mostly focused on this point of the contract. The pacs rate did not increase
much because couples were not aware that it was an interesting form of registered partnership. But as
couples acquired information about the contract, the pacs rate started to grow naturally. When the
reform was settled in 2005, most couples did not know that the pacs became more attractive in terms
of taxation. Therefore, they did not answer the incentive right after the reform. But information
relative to taxation of pacsed couples spread out after the reform, explaining why more couples want
to benefit from it as time goes by. In the same time, couples that decide to contract a pacs for reasons
distinct from taxation acquired information about the pacs. Then they could react directly to the
incentive. This kind of couples could be a stable part of the population, explaining why the schedule
impact of the reform did not increase over time.
The incentive impact of the reform on the decision to contract a pacs indicates that unmarried
couples are likely to consider the amount of tax paid at the household level, inducing some income
pooling between the partners. However, the lack of micro data forbids a better analysis of intrahouse-
holds behavior.
Moreover, the results indicate that couples do react to fiscal incentives, meaning that the public
policies could impact the marital status of partners. So the marital status of partners could be led
by political choices on the family.
The attractive tax system for broken couples after the reform impacts the dissolution behavior of
couples. However, it is not possible to distinguish if the reinforcement of the seasonality is explained
by an increase in the dissolution rates or an adaptation of couples to the new system. However, the
adaptation results in a jump from 0.0167 to 0.0333 of the dissolution rate for 1000 persons aged 15-59
years old (approximatively 40 millions): so it represents roughly 700 broken pacs by court i.e. 1%
of all dissolutions. So even if the impact of a dissolution on taxes is large, it did not infer a large
increase in the dissolution behavior of couples. Was this result unexpected? Not really, given that
the benefit from the tax system is evaluated at the couple level. But at the spouse level the reform is
not necessarily attractive, unless spouses transfer income to each other. Contracting/breaking up a
pacs is attractive when spouses pool their income or at least if they can easily transfer income from
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the richer to the poorer one. Getting pacs is part of the construction of the couple: so they can easily
pool their income. But breaking a pacs in order to benefit from the tax system require some ex post
transfers that are less easily done by a breaking couple. Couples do not take advantage of the tax
incentive the year they break up: it tends to show that couples do not do ex post transfers. So, even
if this would be benefic at the couple level, they do not pool their income once they decide to break
up their pacs. Of course, this system could be used as tax evasion means14. In that case, fake couples
could contract a pacs and break up the pacs every other year in order to optimize the tax they have
to pay. We provide suggestive evidence that if this kind of behavior exists, it is very marginal.
7 Conclusion
A costs/benefits analysis of marital behavior predicts that an attractive taxation of married couples
should increase marriage rates. Although taxation is not marriage-neutral in many countries, taxation
has not been found to have a clear and significant impact on marriage rates. In some Western Europe
countries, couples can either get married or contract an other form of marital contract. In France,
this contract is called pacs. I show that taxation does impact the decision to contract a pacs in France
and that 16-20% of pacs contracted in 2009 can be attributed to an attractive tax system.
The identification strategy relies on a difference in difference method. The tax system changed for
pacsed partners in 2005. Before 2005, the date the pacs was contracted did not change the amount of
income taxation paid for that year. After 2005, the date of the pacs impacts the amount of tax paid.
It is now more attractive to contract a pacs, especially if it is contracted during the attractive part
of the year. I distinguish two types of reaction to the reform: the incentive impact (couples getting
pacsed because of the tax incentive) and the schedule impact (couples that would have contracted a
pacs without the reform but change the day they contract it in order to benefit from the tax system).
I show that the schedule impact stays stable and represents 0.15-0.30 points of the average pacs rate
in the courts. The incentive impacts was very small right after the reform, but it increased over time
and it represents 0.65-0.85 points of the average pacs rates (i.e. 16-20% of the total mean pacs rate)
in 2009. I do not find any impact of income taxation on the decision to break up the pacs.
The paper shows that although marriage behaviors are not closely related to tax incentive, pacs
14 This possibility was raised by the deputy Charles de Courson since the pacs was created. In 2010, the tax system
has been amended. During the debate, he said "When we were talking about the creation of the pacs, I raised the
problem saying that I would write in the classifies in Le Nouvel Obs: ’Single looks for female student without income to
contract a six months pacs in order to share fiscal benefit’. Because the mecanism allows to pacs every January 1st and
to unpacs every July 1st. This risk of embezzlement of this civil goal led to the adoption of an amendment imposing a
minimal duration of 3 years before having the fiscal benefit. But alas, our majority [Right parties, majority in France
since 2002] got rid off this clause contrary to my opinion. Now we witness the beginning of the embezzlement of the
law." - From debates on "Projet de loi de finances pour 2011 : Articles de la deuxième partie"
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behaviors are sensitive to attractive taxation. However, the relationship between pacs and tax is not
as close to what politics feared. Indeed, deputies feared that pacs could favor tax evasion. I show
that there is no evidence that the dissolution of pacs has been favored by the tax system. The tax
system the year of the pacs/marriage has been changed in 2010 (starting in 2011): since 2011, couples
do not benefit from the tax system presented in the paper. There were several reasons invoked to
justify the reform, among which the idea that pacs favored tax evasion.
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A Annexes





• Before 2005: separate during
3 years, common after
• After 2005: common since
the day the pacs is con-
tracted
Common since the day the marriage
is contracted
Inheritance
• Surviving partner has
to be declared in the
testimony
• High tax rates: after a
1564eur allowance, tax
rate of 60%
• Surviving partner has to be
declared in the testimony
• Since 2007: No tax
• Before 2007: marginal tax
rate of 40% until 15000eur,
50% after
• Surviving partner automati-
cally inherits from the spouse
• Since 2007: No tax
• Before 2007: Taxed, but
lower rates than pacsed part-
ners
Assets sharing No asset sharing, unless
bought together
• Since 2006: By default,
the contract separates assets.
But the type of contracts can
be changed.
• Before 2006: Depends on the
contract when the pacs is
contracted.
By default, the contract separate as-
sets bought before the marriage, but
assets bought after the marriage are
common (communauté de biens ré-
duite aux acquêts). But the type of
contracts can be changed (for sepa-
rate or community of all assets.
Debts No solidarity Solidarity of debts linked to every-
day life and housing
Solidarity of debts (but protection
of the housing)
Adoption No legal adoption by the part-
ners (but one can adopt on its
own)
No legal adoption by the partners








Citizenship No citizenship No citizenship, but being pacsed
can be a relevant piece
Citizenship after 4 years
Break up Unilateral or common. No
cost, but no alimony nor dam-
ages pension
Unilateral or common. No great
costs: letter to the court. But no
alimony, possibility of damages pen-
sion
Common. Divorce costs (obligation
to be dissolved by a judge). Pos-
sibility of alimonies and damages
pension
Legal features at the end of 2009
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A.1 Identification strategy
The number of pacs contracted during the quarter q in a court i is given by:





−(1− p0T )γT , if q=4
−p0TγT , if q=1
p1TβT + p2TγT , if q=2
(1− p1T )βT + (1− p2T )γT , if q=3
Let aggregate the quarters of the attractive part of the year, so that: yiT,t=0 = yiT,q=4, yiT,t=1 =
yiT,q=1 and yiT,t=2 = yiT,q=2 + yiT,q=3
Therefore, yiT t can be rewritten as:





−(1− pT )γT , if t=0;
−pTγT , if t=1;
α0 + αT + βT + γT , if t=2;
Then, the parameters of the difference in differences in differences estimation identifies some
functions of the structural parameters:
yitT = α0 + αT + αit − (1− pT )γT1{t = 0} − pTγT1{t = 1}
+(α0 + αT + βT + γT )1{t = 2}+ uitT
= α0 + αit + [αT − (1− pT )γT ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
a0T
+ [(1− 2pT )γT ]1{t = 1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
a1T
+ α01{t = 2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
in the fixed effect
+ [αT + βT + (2− pT )γT ]1{t = 2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
a2T
+uitT





a0T = αT − (1− pT )γT
a1T = (1− 2pT )γT
a2T = αT + βT + (2− pT )γT
As a consequence, given the akT ’s the structural parameters αT , γT and βT are functions of pT :














αT , γT and βT are monotonous functions of pT . In particular, the derivative of γT is of the same




γT (0) = a1T
γT (1) = −a1T
limpT→1/2− γT (pT ) = sgn(a1T )∞
limpT→1/2+ γT (pT ) = −sgn(a1T )∞
Therefore, γT has the same sign on ] −∞; 1/2[ and the opposite sign on ]1/2;+∞[. As a conse-




βT (0) = a2T − a0T − 3a1T
βT (1) = a2T − a0T + a1T
limp→1/2− βT (pT ) = −sgn(a1T )∞
limp→1/2+ γT (pT ) = sgn(a1T )∞
If a1T > 0, βT (pT ) ≥ 0:
• ∀pT ∈ [0, p]∪]1/2,+∞[ if a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0, with p such as βT p = 0
• ∀pT ∈]1/2, p[ if a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0, with p such as βT p = 0
If a1T < 0, βT (pT ) ≥ 0:
• ∀pT ∈]−∞, 1/2[∪[p, 1] if a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0, with p such as βT p = 0
• ∀pT ∈]p, 1/2[ if a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0, with p such as βT p = 0
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As a consequence, the conditions βT (pT ) ≥ 0 and γT (pT ) ≥ 0 are jointly verified if:
1. a1T > 0 and a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0: βT (pT ) ≥ 0 and γT (pT ) ≥ 0 ∀pT ∈ [0, pT ], with βT (p) = 0.
2. a1T < 0 and a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0: βT (pT ) ≥ 0 and γT (pT ) ≥ 0 ∀pT ∈ [pT , 1], with βT (p) = 0.
Depending on the sign of a1T , the sets [0, p] and [p, 1] define lower and upper bounds to αT , βT
and γT .
However, by construction, the lower bound for βT is always zero and is not informative. But if
the sign of a1T remains constant and the conditions are verified for all T then it is possible to define
a unique p∗ such as βT (p
∗) ≥ 0 and γT (p
∗) ≥ 0. If a1T > 0, p
∗ = min{pT ;T ≥ T0} and if a1T < 0,
p∗ = max{pT ;T ≥ T0}.
To sum up, the important conditions for the identification of bounds to βT and to γT are:
• either a1T > 0 and a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0 ∀T ≥ 0 ⇒ p
∗ = min{pT ;T ≥ T0}
• or a1T < 0 and a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0 ∀T ≥ 0 ⇒ p
∗ = max{pT ;T ≥ T0}
As a consequence, it is not possible to identify bounds such as βT ≥ 0 and to γT ≥ 0 if a1T > 0
and a2T − a0T − 3a1T < 0 or if a1T < 0 and a2T − a0T + a1T < 0. It means that it is not possible
to find a p that ensure that βT ≥ 0 and to γT ≥ 0 at the same time, meaning that the reform has
unexpected impacts on the outcome.
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Computation by the author
Optimal day of pacs/marriage





























Subsample of unmarried couples having up to 2 children − N=3914
Data: French Labor Force Survey 2005
Computation by the author
Depending on the number of children
Distribution of the optimal day(s) of pacs/marriage


























































Data: LFS 2005, computation by the author
Lecture: households of the lowest decile spend 0% of their income in taxes for a regular year
and they would have spent 0% of their income in taxes if they had married/got pacsed
(in % of household income)
Annual taxes paid by unmarried couples
Figure 3: Taxes saved the year of marriage/pacs for a regular year - simulation
36
A.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Evolution of the pacs rate for 1000 persons aged 15-59
year Mean Stan.Dev. Min Max
2000 .50 .22 .04 1.65
2001 .45 .20 0 1.21
2002 .52 .23 .08 1.34
2003 .66 .27 .10 1.62
2004 .83 .36 .15 3.24
2005 1.36 .47 .19 3.29
2006 1.70 .56 .33 3.72
2007 2.20 .67 .36 4.36
2008 3.42 .90 .61 5.80
2009 4.05 1.11 .14 6.65
N=443. Data: Ministry of Justice
Lecture: In 2000, 0.5 pacs per 1000 persons
aged 15-59 years old have been contracted by
court. The minimum rate is 0.04 and the max-
imum is 1.65.
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Table 3: Evolution of the rate of dissolution of pacs for 1000 persons aged 15-59
year Mean Stan.Dev. Min Max
2000 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.075
2001 0.033 0.033 0.000 0.162
2002 0.064 0.056 0.000 0.432
2003 0.099 0.070 0.000 0.388
2004 0.146 0.094 0.000 0.644
2005 0.191 0.110 0.000 0.617
2006 0.205 0.107 0.000 0.618
2007 0.249 0.122 0.000 0.683
2008 0.291 0.133 0.000 0.787
2009 0.370 0.156 0.000 0.847
N=443. Data: Ministry of Justice
Lecture: In 2000, for 1000 persons aged 15-
59 in the court, 0.009 pacs have been broken
up by court. The minimum rate is 0 and the
maximum rate is 0.075 per 1000.
Table 4: Evolution of the rate of dissolution of pacs for 1000 pacs
year Mean Stan.Dev. Min Max
2000 .020 .046 0 .5
2001 .037 .039 0 .25
2002 .046 .039 0 .278
2003 .051 .032 0 .175
2004 .056 .031 0 .238
2005 .051 .026 0 .235
2006 .039 .017 0 .118
2007 .035 .017 0 .179
2008 .028 .011 0 .073
2009 .027 .009 0 .058
N=443. Data: Ministry of Justice. The de-
nominator is the number of pacs contracted in
the court before and during the year consid-
ered.
Lecture: In 2000, for 1000 pacs contracted (in
stock) in the court, 0.2 have been broken up by
court. The minimum rate is 0 and the maxi-


































Data: Ministry of Justice































1 2 3 4
Quarter
Before reform After reform
Data: Ministry of Justice
Mean pacs rate by quarter for each year






































Data: Ministry of Justice

































1 2 3 4
Quarter
Before reform After reform
Data: Ministry of Justice
Mean rate of dissolution by quarter for each year






































Data: Ministry of Justice
Mean rate of dissolution of pacs by quarter by court

























Data: Ministry of Justice and INSEE
Rate per 1000 persons aged 15−59
Marriage and union rates in France




Table 5: Difference in differences estimation: impact of the reform on the pacs rate
Pacs for 1000 persons aged 15-59 Pacs rate for 1000 couples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year 2001 .0603∗∗∗ (.00662) .0602∗∗∗ (.00682) -.00623 (.00713) -.00364 (.0137) .142∗∗∗ (.0164) .151∗∗∗ (.0182) -.0179 (.0168) .105∗∗∗ (.0342)
Year 2002 .0627∗∗∗ (.00699) .0624∗∗∗ (.00731) -.00384 (.00752) .00133 (.0244) .151∗∗∗ (.0177) .17∗∗∗ (.0196) -.00905 (.0181) .236∗∗∗ (.063)
Year 2003 .141∗∗∗ (.00812) .141∗∗∗ (.00856) .0748∗∗∗ (.00856) .0825∗∗ (.0353) .34∗∗∗ (.0205) .371∗∗∗ (.022) .18∗∗∗ (.0203) .545∗∗∗ (.0932)
Year 2004 .231∗∗∗ (.0116) .23∗∗∗ (.0119) .164∗∗∗ (.0117) .174∗∗∗ (.0469) .555∗∗∗ (.0279) .596∗∗∗ (.0289) .395∗∗∗ (.0271) .879∗∗∗ (.124)
Year 2005 .262∗∗∗ (.00876) .261∗∗∗ (.00992) .195∗∗∗ (.00885) .208∗∗∗ (.0567) .631∗∗∗ (.0226) .682∗∗∗ (.0253) .471∗∗∗ (.0211) 1.07∗∗∗ (.152)
Year 2006 .374∗∗∗ (.00974) .373∗∗∗ (.0115) .308∗∗∗ (.00968) .323∗∗∗ (.0678) .905∗∗∗ (.0259) .968∗∗∗ (.0294) .745∗∗∗ (.0238) 1.46∗∗∗ (.182)
Year 2007 .524∗∗∗ (.0114) .523∗∗∗ (.0137) .458∗∗∗ (.0115) .475∗∗∗ (.0787) 1.26∗∗∗ (.0303) 1.34∗∗∗ (.0349) 1.1∗∗∗ (.0287) 1.94∗∗∗ (.211)
Year 2008 .95∗∗∗ (.015) .949∗∗∗ (.0174) .883∗∗∗ (.0151) .904∗∗∗ (.0897) 2.28∗∗∗ (.0398) 2.36∗∗∗ (.0444) 2.11∗∗∗ (.0381) 3.06∗∗∗ (.242)
Year 2009 1.18∗∗∗ (.0196) 1.18∗∗∗ (.022) 1.11∗∗∗ (.02) 1.14∗∗∗ (.0999) 2.82∗∗∗ (.0514) 2.92∗∗∗ (.0561) 2.66∗∗∗ (.0508) 3.73∗∗∗ (.269)
Sem. 2 × Year 2001 -.167∗∗∗ (.00784) -.167∗∗∗ (.00834) -.0341∗∗∗ (.00814) -.0341∗∗∗ (.00815) -.4∗∗∗ (.0211) -.395∗∗∗ (.0264) -.0799∗∗∗ (.0189) -.0806∗∗∗ (.0189)
Sem. 2 × Year 2002 -.0976∗∗∗ (.00899) -.0977∗∗∗ (.00909) .0355∗∗∗ (.00897) .0355∗∗∗ (.00898) -.237∗∗∗ (.0243) -.231∗∗∗ (.0271) .0838∗∗∗ (.0211) .0824∗∗∗ (.0211)
Sem. 2 × Year 2003 -.115∗∗∗ (.0103) -.115∗∗∗ (.00988) .0186∗ (.00952) .0185∗ (.00953) -.274∗∗∗ (.0282) -.269∗∗∗ (.0274) .046∗∗ (.0222) .044∗∗ (.0222)
Sem. 2 × Year 2004 -.131∗∗∗ (.0145) -.131∗∗∗ (.0139) .00191 (.013) .00187 (.013) -.314∗∗∗ (.037) -.309∗∗∗ (.0341) .00588 (.0291) .00328 (.0291)
Sem. 2 × Year 2005 .336∗∗∗ (.0177) .336∗∗∗ (.0162) .469∗∗∗ (.0144) .469∗∗∗ (.0144) .818∗∗∗ (.0508) .823∗∗∗ (.0416) 1.14∗∗∗ (.0379) 1.14∗∗∗ (.0378)
Sem. 2 × Year 2006 .453∗∗∗ (.0209) .453∗∗∗ (.0193) .586∗∗∗ (.0161) .586∗∗∗ (.0161) 1.1∗∗∗ (.0603) 1.11∗∗∗ (.0491) 1.42∗∗∗ (.0426) 1.42∗∗∗ (.0426)
Sem. 2 × Year 2007 .655∗∗∗ (.0259) .655∗∗∗ (.0246) .788∗∗∗ (.0209) .788∗∗∗ (.0209) 1.59∗∗∗ (.0739) 1.6∗∗∗ (.0629) 1.91∗∗∗ (.0552) 1.91∗∗∗ (.0551)
Sem. 2 × Year 2008 1.03∗∗∗ (.0349) 1.03∗∗∗ (.034) 1.16∗∗∗ (.0279) 1.16∗∗∗ (.0279) 2.47∗∗∗ (.0969) 2.47∗∗∗ (.0869) 2.79∗∗∗ (.073) 2.78∗∗∗ (.073)
Sem. 2 × Year 2009 1.2∗∗∗ (.0442) 1.2∗∗∗ (.0434) 1.33∗∗∗ (.0366) 1.33∗∗∗ (.0366) 2.88∗∗∗ (.12) 2.88∗∗∗ (.11) 3.2∗∗∗ (.0938) 3.19∗∗∗ (.0937)
Constant .248∗∗∗ (.00479) .35 (.305) .248∗∗∗ (.00799) -4.16∗∗ (1.65) .6∗∗∗ (.0128) 1.67∗∗ (.842) .6∗∗∗ (.0221) -2.56 (4.53)
Observations 8860 8860 8860 8860 8860 8860 8860 8860
R
2 0.801 0.813 0.872 0.875 0.752 0.798 0.855 0.863
Fixed effects N N Y Y N N Y Y
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the court level.
Controls include: the rate of households for 1000 inhabitants (as a proxy for household size), the rate of owners, the rate of unemployment, the rate of active adults.












Standard errors clustered at the court level
Fixed effect and controls: rate of households for 1000 inhabitants, of owners, of unemployment, of active adults.
N=443
Pacs rate for 1000 persons aged 15−59
Impact of the reform: DiD estimation
Figure 8: Results of the difference-in-differences estimation - pacs rate (for 1000 persons aged 15-59)
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Table 6: Regression results - pacs rate for 1000 persons ages 15-59
Spe Year a0T a1T a2T Condition Sign a1T Controls Fix. Eff.
1 2001 .0075 ( .0087 ) -.0177 ∗∗∗ ( .0066 ) -.0461 ∗∗∗ ( .0065 ) - F
1 2002 -.0081 ( .0156 ) .0192 ∗∗∗ ( .0064 ) .0432 ∗∗∗ ( .007 ) + F
1 2003 .0426 ∗ ( .0224 ) .0001 ( .0067 ) .056 ∗∗∗ ( .0071 ) NS F
1 2004 .0953 ∗∗∗ ( .03 ) -.0127 ( .0103 ) .0775 ∗∗∗ ( .01 ) NS F
1 2005 .1874 ∗∗∗ ( .0362 ) -.162 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) .4852 ∗∗∗ ( .0131 ) - T N N
1 2006 .2252 ∗∗∗ ( .0434 ) -.1216 ∗∗∗ ( .0081 ) .6791 ∗∗∗ ( .0152 ) - T
1 2007 .3225 ∗∗∗ ( .0499 ) -.1632 ∗∗∗ ( .0086 ) .9349 ∗∗∗ ( .0201 ) - T
1 2008 .5396 ∗∗∗ ( .0571 ) -.1681 ∗∗∗ ( .0108 ) 1.5167 ∗∗∗ ( .027 ) - T
1 2009 .6885 ∗∗∗ ( .0638 ) -.2332 ∗∗∗ ( .0143 ) 1.7677 ∗∗∗ ( .0361 ) - T
2 2001 .0058 ( .0048 ) -.0177 ∗∗∗ ( .0066 ) -.0461 ∗∗∗ ( .0065 ) - F
2 2002 -.0116 ∗∗ ( .0047 ) .0193 ∗∗∗ ( .0064 ) .0433 ∗∗∗ ( .0069 ) + F
2 2003 .0374 ∗∗∗ ( .0053 ) .0001 ( .0067 ) .056 ∗∗∗ ( .0071 ) NS F
2 2004 .0884 ∗∗∗ ( .0079 ) -.0126 ( .0103 ) .0776 ∗∗∗ ( .01 ) NS F
2 2005 .1788 ∗∗∗ ( .0068 ) -.1619 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) .4853 ∗∗∗ ( .013 ) - T N Y
2 2006 .2149 ∗∗∗ ( .0069 ) -.1216 ∗∗∗ ( .0081 ) .6792 ∗∗∗ ( .0152 ) - T
2 2007 .3106 ∗∗∗ ( .0076 ) -.1631 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) .935 ∗∗∗ ( .0201 ) - T
2 2008 .526 ∗∗∗ ( .0096 ) -.168 ∗∗∗ ( .0108 ) 1.5168 ∗∗∗ ( .027 ) - T
2 2009 .6732 ∗∗∗ ( .0132 ) -.2331 ∗∗∗ ( .0143 ) 1.7678 ∗∗∗ ( .0361 ) - T
3 2001 .0057 ( .0049 ) -.0177 ∗∗∗ ( .0066 ) -.0461 ∗∗∗ ( .0065 ) - F
3 2002 -.0118 ∗∗ ( .0052 ) .0193 ∗∗∗ ( .0064 ) .0433 ∗∗∗ ( .0069 ) + F
3 2003 .037 ∗∗∗ ( .006 ) .0001 ( .0067 ) .056 ∗∗∗ ( .0071 ) NS F
3 2004 .0879 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) -.0126 ( .0103 ) .0776 ∗∗∗ ( .01 ) NS F
3 2005 .1782 ∗∗∗ ( .0083 ) -.1619 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) .4853 ∗∗∗ ( .013 ) - T Y N
3 2006 .2142 ∗∗∗ ( .0091 ) -.1215 ∗∗∗ ( .0081 ) .6792 ∗∗∗ ( .0152 ) - T
3 2007 .3098 ∗∗∗ ( .0107 ) -.1631 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) .9351 ∗∗∗ ( .0201 ) - T
3 2008 .5251 ∗∗∗ ( .0126 ) -.1679 ∗∗∗ ( .0108 ) 1.5168 ∗∗∗ ( .027 ) - T
3 2009 .6722 ∗∗∗ ( .0165 ) -.233 ∗∗∗ ( .0143 ) 1.7678 ∗∗∗ ( .0361 ) - T
4 2001 .0058 ( .0048 ) -.0177 ∗∗∗ ( .0066 ) -.0461 ∗∗∗ ( .0065 ) - F
4 2002 -.0116 ∗∗ ( .0047 ) .0193 ∗∗∗ ( .0064 ) .0433 ∗∗∗ ( .0069 ) + F
4 2003 .0374 ∗∗∗ ( .0053 ) .0001 ( .0067 ) .056 ∗∗∗ ( .0071 ) NS F
4 2004 .0884 ∗∗∗ ( .0079 ) -.0126 ( .0103 ) .0776 ∗∗∗ ( .01 ) NS F
4 2005 .1788 ∗∗∗ ( .0068 ) -.1619 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) .4853 ∗∗∗ ( .0131 ) - T Y Y
4 2006 .2149 ∗∗∗ ( .0069 ) -.1216 ∗∗∗ ( .0081 ) .6792 ∗∗∗ ( .0152 ) - T
4 2007 .3106 ∗∗∗ ( .0076 ) -.1631 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) .935 ∗∗∗ ( .0201 ) - T
4 2008 .526 ∗∗∗ ( .0096 ) -.168 ∗∗∗ ( .0108 ) 1.5168 ∗∗∗ ( .027 ) - T
4 2009 .6732 ∗∗∗ ( .0132 ) -.2331∗∗∗ ( .0143 ) 1.7678∗∗∗ ( .0361 ) - T
When a1T < 0, condition is equal to "T" (true) if the condition a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0 is verified and to "F" (false) otherwise.
When a1T > 0, condition is equal to "T" (true) if the condition a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0 is verified and to "F" (false) otherwise.
Controls include: the rate of households for 1000 inhabitants (as a proxy for household size), the rate of owners, the rate of
unemployment, the rate of active adults.
Standard errors are clustered at the court level
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Table 7: Regression results - pacs rate for 1000 couples
Spe Year a0T a1T a2T Sign a1T Condition Controls Fix. Eff.
1 2001 .0952 ∗∗∗ ( .022 ) -.0438 ∗∗∗ ( .0153 ) -.1114 ∗∗∗ ( .0151 ) - F
1 2002 .1358 ∗∗∗ ( .0406 ) .0455 ∗∗∗ ( .0148 ) .1011 ∗∗∗ ( .0162 ) + F
1 2003 .3327 ∗∗∗ ( .0592 ) .0017 ( .0152 ) .1356 ∗∗∗ ( .0166 ) NS F
1 2004 .5357 ∗∗∗ ( .0792 ) -.0309 ( .023 ) .1859 ∗∗∗ ( .0224 ) NS F N N
1 2005 .833 ∗∗∗ ( .0967 ) -.3915 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) 1.1753 ∗∗∗ ( .0347 ) - F
1 2006 1.0013 ∗∗∗ ( .1171 ) -.2982 ∗∗∗ ( .0197 ) 1.6451 ∗∗∗ ( .0411 ) - T
1 2007 1.3059 ∗∗∗ ( .1339 ) -.3949 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) 2.261 ∗∗∗ ( .0541 ) - T
1 2008 1.8997 ∗∗∗ ( .1546 ) -.418 ∗∗∗ ( .0261 ) 3.6302 ∗∗∗ ( .0711 ) - T
1 2009 2.3269 ∗∗∗ ( .1715 ) -.5709 ∗∗∗ ( .0347 ) 4.2418 ∗∗∗ ( .0927 ) - T
2 2001 .0127 ( .0111 ) -.0429 ∗∗∗ ( .0153 ) -.1104 ∗∗∗ ( .0151 ) - F
2 2002 -.0282 ∗∗ ( .0113 ) .0473 ∗∗∗ ( .0148 ) .103 ∗∗∗ ( .0161 ) + F
2 2003 .088 ∗∗∗ ( .0123 ) .0044 ( .0152 ) .1383 ∗∗∗ ( .0166 ) NS F
2 2004 .2111 ∗∗∗ ( .0181 ) -.0275 ( .0229 ) .1894 ∗∗∗ ( .0224 ) NS F N Y
2 2005 .4294 ∗∗∗ ( .0165 ) -.3872 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) 1.1796 ∗∗∗ ( .0348 ) - T
2 2006 .5196 ∗∗∗ ( .0171 ) -.2931 ∗∗∗ ( .0196 ) 1.6501 ∗∗∗ ( .0411 ) - T
2 2007 .7467 ∗∗∗ ( .0187 ) -.3891 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) 2.2668 ∗∗∗ ( .0542 ) - T
2 2008 1.2638 ∗∗∗ ( .0247 ) -.4115 ∗∗∗ ( .0259 ) 3.6367 ∗∗∗ ( .0712 ) - T
2 2009 1.615 ∗∗∗ ( .0337 ) -.5638 ∗∗∗ ( .0346 ) 4.249 ∗∗∗ ( .0928 ) - T
3 2001 .0201 ∗ ( .0116 ) -.043 ∗∗∗ ( .0153 ) -.1105 ∗∗∗ ( .0151 ) - F
3 2002 -.0134 ( .013 ) .0472 ∗∗∗ ( .0148 ) .1028 ∗∗∗ ( .0162 ) + F
3 2003 .11 ∗∗∗ ( .0149 ) .0042 ( .0152 ) .1381 ∗∗∗ ( .0166 ) NS F
3 2004 .2404 ∗∗∗ ( .021 ) -.0277 ( .023 ) .1891 ∗∗∗ ( .0224 ) NS F
3 2005 .4659 ∗∗∗ ( .0211 ) -.3875 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) 1.1793 ∗∗∗ ( .0348 ) - T Y N
3 2006 .5632 ∗∗∗ ( .0236 ) -.2935 ∗∗∗ ( .0196 ) 1.6497 ∗∗∗ ( .0411 ) - T
3 2007 .7973 ∗∗∗ ( .0274 ) -.3895 ∗∗∗ ( .0207 ) 2.2664 ∗∗∗ ( .0542 ) - T
3 2008 1.3214 ∗∗∗ ( .0328 ) -.412 ∗∗∗ ( .026 ) 3.6362 ∗∗∗ ( .0712 ) - T
3 2009 1.6796 ∗∗∗ ( .0426 ) -.5643 ∗∗∗ ( .0346 ) 4.2484 ∗∗∗ ( .0928 ) - T
4 2001 .0127 ( .0111 ) -.0429 ∗∗∗ ( .0153 ) -.1104 ∗∗∗ ( .0151 ) - F
4 2002 -.0282 ∗∗ ( .0113 ) .0473 ∗∗∗ ( .0148 ) .103 ∗∗∗ ( .0161 ) + F
4 2003 .088 ∗∗∗ ( .0123 ) .0044 ( .0152 ) .1383 ∗∗∗ ( .0166 ) NS F
4 2004 .2111 ∗∗∗ ( .0181 ) -.0275 ( .0229 ) .1894 ∗∗∗ ( .0224 ) NS F
4 2005 .4294 ∗∗∗ ( .0165 ) -.3872 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) 1.1796 ∗∗∗ ( .0348 ) - T Y Y
4 2006 .5196 ∗∗∗ ( .0171 ) -.2931 ∗∗∗ ( .0196 ) 1.6501 ∗∗∗ ( .0411 ) - T
4 2007 .7467 ∗∗∗ ( .0187 ) -.3891 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) 2.2668 ∗∗∗ ( .0542 ) - T
4 2008 1.2638 ∗∗∗ ( .0247 ) -.4115 ∗∗∗ ( .0259 ) 3.6367 ∗∗∗ ( .0712 ) - T
4 2009 1.615∗∗∗ ( .0337 ) -.5638∗∗∗ ( .0346 ) 4.249∗∗∗ ( .0928 ) - T
When a1T < 0, condition is equal to "T" (true) if the condition a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0 is verified and to "F" (false) otherwise.
When a1T > 0, condition is equal to "T" (true) if the condition a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0 is verified and to "F" (false) otherwise.
Controls include: the rate of households for 1000 inhabitants (as a proxy for household size), the rate of owners, the rate of
unemployment, the rate of active adults.
Standard errors are clustered at the court level
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Table 8: Difference in differences estimation: impact of the reform on the dissolution rate for 1000
persons aged 15-59
Dissolution rate for 1000 persons aged 15-59
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 2001 .0106∗∗∗ (.000931) .011∗∗∗ (.000967) .0106∗∗∗ (.000981) .0121∗∗∗ (.00168)
Year 2002 .0236∗∗∗ (.00137) .0245∗∗∗ (.00147) .0236∗∗∗ (.00144) .0266∗∗∗ (.00304)
Year 2003 .041∗∗∗ (.00187) .0423∗∗∗ (.00201) .041∗∗∗ (.00197) .0455∗∗∗ (.00434)
Year 2004 .0717∗∗∗ (.00225) .0736∗∗∗ (.00252) .0634∗∗∗ (.00256) .0693∗∗∗ (.00587)
Year 2005 .0777∗∗∗ (.00258) .0799∗∗∗ (.00294) .0777∗∗∗ (.00272) .0851∗∗∗ (.00716)
Year 2006 .0853∗∗∗ (.0027) .0879∗∗∗ (.00308) .0853∗∗∗ (.00285) .0941∗∗∗ (.00831)
Year 2007 .111∗∗∗ (.00316) .114∗∗∗ (.00362) .111∗∗∗ (.00333) .121∗∗∗ (.00945)
Year 2008 .128∗∗∗ (.00338) .132∗∗∗ (.00378) .128∗∗∗ (.00356) .14∗∗∗ (.0107)
Year 2009 .163∗∗∗ (.00391) .167∗∗∗ (.00433) .163∗∗∗ (.00412) .176∗∗∗ (.0121)
Year 2000×Sem. 2 .00682∗∗∗ (.000723) .00704∗∗∗ (.00074) -.00989∗∗∗ (.00299) -.00986∗∗∗ (.00299)
Year 2001×Sem. 2 .00987∗∗∗ (.00132) .0101∗∗∗ (.00132) -.00683∗∗ (.00333) -.00681∗∗ (.00334)
Year 2002×Sem. 2 .014∗∗∗ (.00223) .0143∗∗∗ (.00224) -.00266 (.00368) -.00265 (.00368)
Year 2003×Sem. 2 .0151∗∗∗ (.00233) .0154∗∗∗ (.00234) -.00156 (.00373) -.00155 (.00373)
Year 2005×Sem. 2 .0333∗∗∗ (.00327) .0336∗∗∗ (.00327) .0166∗∗∗ (.00435) .0166∗∗∗ (.00435)
Year 2006×Sem. 2 .0323∗∗∗ (.00309) .0325∗∗∗ (.00309) .0156∗∗∗ (.00423) .0156∗∗∗ (.00423)
Year 2007×Sem. 2 .0253∗∗∗ (.00352) .0255∗∗∗ (.0035) .00862∗ (.00452) .0086∗ (.00452)
Year 2008×Sem. 2 .0324∗∗∗ (.00401) .0326∗∗∗ (.00402) .0157∗∗∗ (.00524) .0156∗∗∗ (.00524)
Year 2009×Sem. 2 .042∗∗∗ (.0044) .0422∗∗∗ (.0044) .0253∗∗∗ (.00539) .0253∗∗∗ (.0054)
Constant .00456∗∗∗ (.00036) .092 (.0569) .00456∗∗∗ (.00163) -.2 (.191)
Observations 8860 8860 8860 8860
R2 0.487 0.523 0.594 0.600
Fixed effects N N Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the court level.
Controls include: the rate of households for 1000 inhabitants (as a proxy for household size),
the rate of owners, the rate of unemployment, the rate of active adults.
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
48
Table 9: Difference in differences estimation: impact of the reform on the dissolution rate for 1000
pacs
Dissolution rate for 1000 pacs
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Year 2001 -.000711 (.00464) -.000655 (.00464) .00119 (.00534) .00162 (.00572)
Year 2002 .000378 (.00386) .000577 (.00386) .00228 (.00446) .00315 (.00512)
Year 2003 .00337 (.00353) .00371 (.00354) .00527 (.00415) .00659 (.00522)
Year 2004 .00677∗∗ (.00335) .00728∗∗ (.00336) .00775∗∗ (.00366) .0095∗ (.00528)
Year 2005 .00312 (.00338) .00373 (.0034) .00502 (.00394) .00721 (.006)
Year 2006 -.00429 (.0033) -.00355 (.00332) -.0024 (.0039) .000225 (.00645)
Year 2007 -.00533 (.00337) -.00445 (.0034) -.00344 (.00396) -.000385 (.00708)
Year 2008 -.00898∗∗∗ (.00334) -.00797∗∗ (.00337) -.00709∗ (.00395) -.00361 (.00761)
Year 2009 -.011∗∗∗ (.00332) -.00986∗∗∗ (.00336) -.0091∗∗ (.00393) -.0052 (.00817)
Year 2001×Sem. 2
Year 2002×Sem. 2 .00342 (.0023) .00349 (.0023) .00275 (.0044) .00296 (.0046)
Year 2003×Sem. 2 .00217 (.0017) .00224 (.0017) .00151 (.0044) .00171 (.0045)
Year 2004×Sem. 2 .00184 (.0014) .00191 (.0014) .00117 (.0045) .00138 (.0046)
Year 2005×Sem. 2 .00695∗∗∗ (.0013) .00702∗∗∗ (.0013) .00629 (.0043) .00649 (.0044)
Year 2006×Sem. 2 .00524∗∗∗ (.00092) .00531∗∗∗ (.00092) .00458 (.0041) .00478 (.0042)
Year 2007×Sem. 2 .00178∗∗ (.00077) .00184∗∗ (.00077) .00111 (.0040) .00131 (.0041)
Year 2008×Sem. 2 .00171∗∗∗ (.00059) .00177∗∗∗ (.00059) .00104 (.0040) .00124 (.0041)
Year 2009×Sem. 2 .00187∗∗∗ (.00048) .00193∗∗∗ (.0005) .0012 (.0040) .0014 (.0041)
Constant .0268∗∗∗ (.00164) .0505∗∗∗ (.0108) .0267∗∗∗ (.00161) .129 (.0894)
Observations 8415 8415 8415 8415
R2 0.037 0.044 0.040 0.041
Fixed effects N N Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the court level.
Controls include: the rate of households for 1000 inhabitants (as a proxy for household size),
the rate of owners, the rate of unemployment, the rate of active adults.
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Figure 9: DiD results - broken pacs (for 1000 persons aged 15-59)
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Table 10: Regression results - broken up pacs, rate for 1000 persons 15-59 years old
Year a0T a1T a2T sign a1T condition Fixed effects Controls
2001 0.004 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.002 ∗∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.009 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) + F
2002 0.012 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) -0.001 ( 0.001 ) 0.018 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) NS T
2003 0.021 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) -0.001 ( 0.002 ) 0.029 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) NS T
2004 0.035 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.007 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.038 ∗∗∗ ( 0.003 ) - F Y N
2005 0.044 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.011 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.060 ∗∗∗ ( 0.003 ) - T
2006 0.047 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.009 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.063 ∗∗∗ ( 0.003 ) - T
2007 0.058 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.005 ∗ ( 0.003 ) 0.072 ∗∗∗ ( 0.004 ) - T
2008 0.064 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.000 ( 0.003 ) 0.090 ∗∗∗ ( 0.004 ) NS T
2009 0.078 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.007 ∗∗ ( 0.003 ) 0.120 ∗∗∗ ( 0.004 ) + T
2001 0.002 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.002 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.017 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) + T
2002 0.010 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) -0.001 ( 0.001 ) 0.026 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) NS T
2003 0.018 ∗∗∗ ( 0.001 ) -0.001 ( 0.002 ) 0.036 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) NS T
2004 0.032 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.006 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.046 ∗∗∗ ( 0.003 ) - T
2005 0.041 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.010 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.068 ∗∗∗ ( 0.003 ) - T N N
2006 0.045 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.009 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.071 ∗∗∗ ( 0.003 ) - T
2007 0.055 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.004 ( 0.003 ) 0.079 ∗∗∗ ( 0.004 ) NS T
2008 0.061 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.001 ( 0.003 ) 0.097 ∗∗∗ ( 0.004 ) NS T
2009 0.075 ∗∗∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.007 ∗∗ ( 0.003 ) 0.128 ∗∗∗ ( 0.004 ) + T
2001 0.002 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.003 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.001 ) + T
2002 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.000 ( 0.001 ) 0.026 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) NS T
2003 0.019 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.000 ( 0.002 ) 0.036 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) NS T
2004 0.033 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.006 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.046 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.003 ) - T
2005 0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.068 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.003 ) - T N Y
2006 0.046 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.009 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.071 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.003 ) - T
2007 0.057 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.004 ( 0.003 ) 0.080 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.004 ) NS T
2008 0.063 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.001 ( 0.003 ) 0.098 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.004 ) NS T
2009 0.078 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.003 ) 0.007 ∗∗ ( 0.003 ) 0.128 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.004 ) + T
2001 0.005 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.002 ∗∗ ( 0.001 ) 0.009 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.001 ) + T
2002 0.014 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) -0.001 ( 0.001 ) 0.018 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) NS T
2003 0.024 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.003 ) -0.001 ( 0.002 ) 0.028 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) NS T
2004 0.039 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.004 ) -0.007 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.003 ) - F
2005 0.049 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.005 ) -0.011 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.060 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.003 ) - T Y Y
2006 0.053 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.005 ) -0.009 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.002 ) 0.063 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.003 ) - T
2007 0.065 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.006 ) -0.005 ∗ ( 0.003 ) 0.072 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.004 ) - T
2008 0.072 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.007 ) 0.000 ( 0.003 ) 0.090 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.004 ) NS T
2009 0.087 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.008 ) 0.007 ∗∗ ( 0.003 ) 0.120 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.004 ) + T
When a1T < 0, condition is equal to "T" (true) if the condition a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0 is verified and to "F" (false) otherwise.
When a1T > 0, condition is equal to "T" (true) if the condition a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0 is verified and to "F" (false) otherwise.
Controls include: the rate of households for 1000 inhabitants (as a proxy for household size),
the rate of owners, the rate of unemployment, the rate of active adults.
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Table 11: Regression results - broken up pacs, rate for 1000 pacs
Year a0T a1T a2T sign a1T condition Fixed effects controls
2002 4.555 ∗∗∗ ( 1.748 ) -4.422 ( 3.138 ) -0.714 ( 2.802 ) NS F
2003 5.836 ∗∗∗ ( 1.554 ) -4.292 ( 2.942 ) -0.250 ( 2.721 ) NS F
2004 8.588 ∗∗∗ ( 1.560 ) -7.100 ∗∗ ( 2.965 ) -0.854 ( 2.672 ) - F Y N
2005 7.266 ∗∗∗ ( 1.428 ) -7.124 ∗∗ ( 2.873 ) 2.851 ( 2.557 ) - F
2006 3.098 ∗∗ ( 1.304 ) -5.734 ∗∗ ( 2.814 ) -2.105 ( 2.282 ) - F
2007 1.677 ( 1.337 ) -3.872 ( 2.754 ) -5.191 ∗∗ ( 2.316 ) NS T
2008 -0.662 ( 1.300 ) -2.820 ( 2.766 ) -6.568 ∗∗∗ ( 2.212 ) NS T
2009 -1.948 ( 1.316 ) -2.106 ( 2.758 ) -7.138 ∗∗∗ ( 2.265 ) NS T
2002 -3.318 ∗∗ ( 1.691 ) -2.140 ( 1.506 ) 16.669 ∗∗∗ ( 1.870 ) NS T
2003 -2.037 ( 1.508 ) -2.010 ∗ ( 1.210 ) 17.133 ∗∗∗ ( 1.480 ) - T
2004 0.715 ( 1.437 ) -4.818 ∗∗∗ ( 1.130 ) 16.529 ∗∗∗ ( 1.292 ) - T
2005 -0.608 ( 1.355 ) -4.842 ∗∗∗ ( 0.893 ) 20.234 ∗∗∗ ( 1.203 ) - T N N
2006 -4.775 ∗∗∗ ( 1.240 ) -3.452 ∗∗∗ ( 0.656 ) 15.278 ∗∗∗ ( 0.864 ) - T
2007 -6.196 ∗∗∗ ( 1.277 ) -1.590 ∗∗∗ ( 0.587 ) 12.192 ∗∗∗ ( 0.746 ) - T
2008 -8.536 ∗∗∗ ( 1.203 ) -0.538 ( 0.424 ) 10.815 ∗∗∗ ( 0.504 ) NS T
2009 -9.822 ∗∗∗ ( 1.211 ) 0.176 ( 0.323 ) 10.245 ∗∗∗ ( 0.434 ) NS T
2002 -3.274 ∗ ( 1.693 ) -2.054 ( 1.508 ) 16.755 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.871 ) NS T
2003 -1.907 ( 1.513 ) -1.925 ( 1.212 ) 17.217 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.479 ) NS T
2004 0.929 ( 1.443 ) -4.736 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.131 ) 16.612 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.291 ) - T
2005 -0.310 ( 1.361 ) -4.760 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.896 ) 20.316 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.203 ) - T N Y
2006 -4.396 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.254 ) -3.372 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.657 ) 15.358 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.865 ) - T
2007 -5.737 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.301 ) -1.511 ∗∗ ( 0.589 ) 12.272 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.747 ) - T
2008 -7.997 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.229 ) -0.460 ( 0.429 ) 10.893 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.507 ) NS T
2009 -9.205 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.247 ) 0.253 ( 0.325 ) 10.322 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 0.435 ) NS T
2002 4.510 ∗∗ ( 1.854 ) -4.436 ( 3.079 ) -0.732 ( 2.836 ) NS F
2003 5.750 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 1.852 ) -4.304 ( 2.878 ) -0.267 ( 2.758 ) NS F
2004 8.461 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 2.145 ) -7.111 ∗∗ ( 2.900 ) -0.869 ( 2.715 ) - F
2005 7.099 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 2.351 ) -7.133 ∗∗ ( 2.819 ) 2.838 ( 2.598 ) - F
2006 2.895 ( 2.688 ) -5.741 ∗∗ ( 2.755 ) -2.117 ( 2.323 ) - F Y Y
2007 1.439 ( 3.124 ) -3.877 ( 2.695 ) -5.201 ∗∗ ( 2.358 ) NS F
2008 -0.934 ( 3.513 ) -2.824 ( 2.708 ) -6.576 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 2.253 ) NS F
2009 -2.253 ( 3.932 ) -2.108 ( 2.703 ) -7.145 ∗ ∗ ∗ ( 2.310 ) NS F
When a1T < 0, condition is equal to "T" (true) if the condition a2T − a0T + a1T ≥ 0 is verified and to "F" (false) otherwise.
When a1T > 0, condition is equal to "T" (true) if the condition a2T − a0T − 3a1T ≥ 0 is verified and to "F" (false) otherwise.
Controls include: the rate of households for 1000 inhabitants (as a proxy for household size),
the rate of owners, the rate of unemployment, the rate of active adults.
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Table 12: Regression results - estimation of the γT , βT and the αT
year γT (p) σ γT (1) σ αT (p) σ αT (1) σ βT (1) σ βT (p) σ
Explained variable: pacs rate for 1000 persons aged 15-59. Specification included court fixed effect and controls
p = 0.853
2001 .0251 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .0177 ∗∗∗ ( .0066 ) .0112 ( .0081 ) .0075 ( .0087 ) -.0861 ∗∗∗ ( .0144 ) -.0714 ∗∗∗ ( .0142 )
2002 -.0273 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) -.0192 ∗∗∗ ( .0064 ) -.0121 ( .0151 ) -.0081 ( .0156 ) .0866 ∗∗∗ ( .0199 ) .0706 ∗∗∗ ( .0196 )
2003 -.0001 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) -.0001 ( .0067 ) .0426 ∗ ( .0221 ) .0426 ∗ ( .0224 ) .0135 ( .0258 ) .0134 ( .0255 )
2004 .018 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .0127 ( .0103 ) .0979 ∗∗∗ ( .0292 ) .0953 ∗∗∗ ( .03 ) -.041 ( .035 ) -.0304 ( .0353 )
2005 .2294 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .162 ∗∗∗ ( .0087 ) .2211 ∗∗∗ ( .0357 ) .1874 ∗∗∗ ( .0362 ) .001 ( .0395 ) .1359 ∗∗∗ ( .0409 )
2006 .1723 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .1216 ∗∗∗ ( .0081 ) .2505 ∗∗∗ ( .0427 ) .2252 ∗∗∗ ( .0434 ) .231 ∗∗∗ ( .0474 ) .3323 ∗∗∗ ( .0482 )
2007 .2311 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .1632 ∗∗∗ ( .0086 ) .3565 ∗∗∗ ( .0496 ) .3225 ∗∗∗ ( .0499 ) .3133 ∗∗∗ ( .0557 ) .4492 ∗∗∗ ( .0554 )
2008 .238 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .1681 ∗∗∗ ( .0108 ) .5746 ∗∗∗ ( .0565 ) .5396 ∗∗∗ ( .0571 ) .6691 ∗∗∗ ( .0622 ) .8091 ∗∗∗ ( .0656 )
2009 .3303 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .2332 ∗∗∗ ( .0143 ) .737 ∗∗∗ ( .0629 ) .6885 ∗∗∗ ( .0638 ) .6518 ∗∗∗ ( .0739 ) .846 ∗∗∗ ( .0768 )
Explained variable: pacs rate for 1000 couples. Specification included court fixed effect and controls
p = 0.817
2001 .0691 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .0438 ∗∗∗ ( .0153 ) .1078 ∗∗∗ ( .0207 ) .0952 ∗∗∗ ( .022 ) -.301 ∗∗∗ ( .0344 ) -.2504 ∗∗∗ ( .0344 )
2002 -.0718 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) -.0455 ∗∗∗ ( .0148 ) .1227 ∗∗∗ ( .0393 ) .1358 ∗∗∗ ( .0406 ) .0633 ( .0486 ) .0108 ( .0494 )
2003 -.0027 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) -.0017 ( .0152 ) .3322 ∗∗∗ ( .0585 ) .3327 ∗∗∗ ( .0592 ) -.1933 ∗∗∗ ( .0654 ) -.1953 ∗∗∗ ( .0655 )
2004 .0488 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .0309 ( .023 ) .5446 ∗∗∗ ( .0776 ) .5357 ∗∗∗ ( .0792 ) -.4165 ∗∗∗ ( .0875 ) -.3807 ∗∗∗ ( .0897 )
2005 .6175 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .3915 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) .946 ∗∗∗ ( .0957 ) .833 ∗∗∗ ( .0967 ) -.5012 ∗∗∗ ( .098 ) -.0492 ( .1075 )
2006 .4703 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .2982 ∗∗∗ ( .0197 ) 1.0874 ∗∗∗ ( .115 ) 1.0013 ∗∗∗ ( .1171 ) .0013 ( .1207 ) .3456 ∗∗∗ ( .1303 )
2007 .6229 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .3949 ∗∗∗ ( .0206 ) 1.4199 ∗∗∗ ( .1331 ) 1.3059 ∗∗∗ ( .1339 ) .1043 ( .1368 ) .5602 ∗∗∗ ( .148 )
2008 .6593 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .418 ∗∗∗ ( .0261 ) 2.0203 ∗∗∗ ( .1521 ) 1.8997 ∗∗∗ ( .1546 ) .8298 ∗∗∗ ( .154 ) 1.3125 ∗∗∗ ( .1775 )
2009 .9005 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 ) .5709 ∗∗∗ ( .0347 ) 2.4917 ∗∗∗ ( .1692 ) 2.3269 ∗∗∗ ( .1715 ) .6848 ∗∗∗ ( .1819 ) 1.344 ∗∗∗ ( .2035 )
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Table 13: Estimated effect of the reform, in % of the total pacs rate
direct impact Schedule impact
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Explained variable: pacs rate for 1000 persons aged 15-59
2001 -.191 ∗∗∗ ( .032 ) -.159 ∗∗∗ ( .032 ) .039 ∗∗∗ ( .015 ) .056 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2002 .165 ∗∗∗ ( .038 ) .134 ∗∗∗ ( .037 ) -.037 ∗∗∗ ( .012 ) -.052 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2003 .02 ( .039 ) .02 ( .038 ) 0 ( .01 ) 0 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2004 -.05 ( .042 ) -.037 ( .043 ) .015 ( .012 ) .022 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2005 .001 ( .029 ) .1 ∗∗∗ ( .03 ) .119 ∗∗∗ ( .006 ) .169 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2006 .136 ∗∗∗ ( .028 ) .196 ∗∗∗ ( .028 ) .072 ∗∗∗ ( .005 ) .101 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2007 .142 ∗∗∗ ( .025 ) .204 ∗∗∗ ( .025 ) .074 ∗∗∗ ( .004 ) .105 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2008 .195 ∗∗∗ ( .018 ) .236 ∗∗∗ ( .019 ) .049 ∗∗∗ ( .003 ) .07 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2009 .161 ∗∗∗ ( .018 ) .209 ∗∗∗ ( .019 ) .058 ∗∗∗ ( .004 ) .082 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
Explained variable: pacs rate for 1000 couples
2001 -.68 ∗∗∗ ( .081 ) -.632 ∗∗∗ ( .082 ) .098 ∗∗∗ ( .034 ) .123 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2002 -.066 ( .105 ) -.108 ( .106 ) -.085 ∗∗∗ ( .028 ) -.106 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2003 -.444 ∗∗∗ ( .115 ) -.445 ∗∗∗ ( .115 ) -.001 ( .023 ) -.001 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2004 -.641 ∗∗∗ ( .122 ) -.622 ∗∗∗ ( .126 ) .039 ( .028 ) .049 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2005 -.301 ∗∗∗ ( .085 ) -.158 ∗ ( .093 ) .29 ∗∗∗ ( .015 ) .362 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2006 0 ( .083 ) .087 ( .09 ) .177 ∗∗∗ ( .012 ) .22 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2007 .061 ( .073 ) .151 ∗ ( .079 ) .181 ∗∗∗ ( .009 ) .225 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
2008 .247 ∗∗∗ ( .051 ) .307 ∗∗∗ ( .06 ) .123 ∗∗∗ ( .008 ) .153 ∗∗∗ ( 0.000 )
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Figure 11: Estimated counterfactuals: lower and upper bounds (pacs rate for 1000 persons aged
15-59) 56
